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The Value of Information in
Multi-Objective Missions
In many multi-objective missions there are situations when actions based on maximum
information gain may not be the ‘best’ given the overall mission objectives. In addition
to properties such as entropy, information also has value, which is situationally dependent.
This thesis examines the concept of information value in a multi-objective mission from an
information theory perspective.
A derivation of information value is presented that considers both the context of information,
via a fused world belief state, and a system mission. The derived information value is used
as part of the objective function for control of autonomous platforms within a framework
developed for human robot cooperative control.
A simulated security operation in a structured environment is implemented to test both
the framework, and information value based control. The simulation involves a system of
heterogeneous, sensor equipped Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), tasked with gathering
information regarding ground vehicles. The UAVs support an effort to protect a number
of important buildings in the area of operation. Thus, the purpose of the information is to
aid the security operation by ensuring that security forces can deploy efficiently to counter
any threat.
A number of different local controllers using information based control are implemented and
compared to a task based control scheme. The relative performance of each is examined
with respect to a number of performance metrics with conclusions drawn regarding the
performance and flexibility of information value based control.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Autonomous vehicles are being increasingly utilised for information gathering tasks in mili-
tary operations, particularly for those missions considered dull, dirty or dangerous. A wide
range of both Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and Uninhabited Ground Vehicle (UGV)
types have been successfully deployed around the world, adding significant capability to
the militaries that field them. Much recent research has focused on teams and the co-
ordintation/cooperation between both the autonomous vehicles themselves, and the human
users. These developments have enhanced the ability of autonomous systems to accomplish
complex missions and extend the capability of simple platforms with limited sensing abil-
ity. These considerations are particularly important for emerging applications such as law
enforcement, search and rescue, bush fire fighting and environmental survey.
Autonomous platforms currently in service are primarily employed in the information gath-
ering role as an aid to situational awareness, where manned systems may be too costly, the
situation considered too dangerous or mission persistence insufficient. Being a situational
awareness tool, the information gathered by the autonomous system will commonly serve
as an enabler for action. This action may be performed by either the information gatherer
or some external agent. For example information gathered by a camera equipped UAV in
aid of bush fire fighting will be used by the fire chief to direct fire crews and refine resource
allocation.
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In the example applications of autonomous vehicles in the civilian and military domains,
the information requirements are varied and dynamic. Further the information may be used
for a number of purposes and directed by agents external to the system. This gives rise
to information objectives which may be dynamic with respect to external mission demands
and current information state. In addition, the demands of the final information customer
or customers may result in multiple conflicting information objectives. As the information
gathering resources are limited, the problem for the system becomes a decision problem
of how to autonomously allocate the available resources to ensure that the information
gathered is most beneficial to the objectives of a wider mission, even as the mission changes.
This recognition of the dynamic nature of the wider mission and the need to adapt to the
wider mission requirements within a multi-objective scenario has not been comprehensively
examined within the robotics community. This gap in research between operations research
and autonomous control of systems has been the motivation for this research.
1.2 Thesis Objectives
This thesis aims to address the control and resource allocation problem outlined by extend-
ing information theoretical control concepts to account for multiple objectives and, via a
framework for examining information value, to enable different information types to be used
in determining cooperative control actions. This extension of information theoretic concepts
also aims to provide a link between the information requirements of a wider mission and
the cooperative control scheme, through human level input from a single operator.
The implementation in the simulation environment is aimed at demonstrating control of a
system of autonomous information gatherers, based on the concept of information value.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are:
• Presentation of a flexible framework for human-robot cooperation that allows for a
wider mission objective to flow through the system and be incorporated into the
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control of autonomous platforms. The framework is designed for the implementation
of different control architectures, different fusion components as well as centralised
and distributed control architectures.
• Presentation of a consistent formulation of information value, based on information
theoretic concepts that takes into account the wider mission objectives as well as
the current information state. The formulation is capable of dealing with multiple
objectives and dynamic information states and mission objectives.
1.4 Thesis Structure
Chapter 2 examines some relevant work from the economics community in the area of valuing
market goods and information as a tradeable good. The difficulty of defining information
value, due to a number of unique attributes, is highlighted along with the relationship
between information value and the agent decision problem.
Chapter 3 details a method of determining information value for a mission with multi-
ple objectives. The formulation captures both the current information state along with a
preference ordering for different information types that is situation dependant.
Chapter 4 describes the architecture of the simulator used to investigate information value
based control. The architecture is generic to a multi-agent information gathering task and
can be applied to both centralised and distributed control and information fusion schemes.
Chapter 5 details the implementation of information value for an urban security scenario.
This scenario consists of a number airborne sensor platforms finding and tracking ground
vehicles in an urban road network where static assets are to be protected. A number of
different control schemes are described along with an outline of the code used for simulation
and the relevant operator interfaces.
Chapter 6 provides detail on the setup of the simulated system and includes the situations:
− baseline with no modification to the information gain rate utility/preference ordering
− modification to information gain rate utility/preference ordering based on human
input
− addition of external information into the system
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Data from running each situation in simulation is presented with associated evaluation
metrics.
Chapter 7 draws some conclusions from the simulation data and identifies potential direc-
tions for future work.
Chapter 2
Related Work
2.1 Valuing Goods in a Market
There are many economic theories and models which provide ways of valuing and predicting
the value of market goods. These can be broadly described by the concepts of intrinsic and
subjective value.
Intrinsic value theory relates value to some intrinsic property of the good. This implies that
a market value is determined irrespective of the individual value judgements of the agents
participating in the market [7]. An important incarnation of the concept of intrinsic value,
proposed by Smith, Ricardo and Marx among others, is the labour value theory [30]. This
states that if supply and demand are in equilibrium, the value of a good is related only to
the labour or effort expended in producing the good [35].
In the body of current economic theory, intrinsic value is not generally accepted as being
useful in free markets, but is often used by proponents to decry profiteering and to demon-
strate labour exploitation, thus justifying a command economy [7]. One of the issues pointed
to as a flaw in intrinsic value, is that for trade to occur each agent must have an incentive
to trade. If the value of a good were constant for all agents, then an agent will have little
incentive to trade, or alternatively once a good is acquired there is as much incentive to
on-trade the good to another agent as there is to keep the good [7]. This implies that for
market trade, there must be some discrepancy in the value of the good as judged by the
agent’s performing the transaction and hence the value of a good is not solely dependant
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on intrinsic properties.
This subjective view of value has traditionally been illustrated by the so called diamond/water
paradox. A diamond does not fill any base human need to survive, unlike water, which is
arguably more useful. However diamonds are far more costly and by implication more valu-
able [39]. If offered either diamonds or a bottle of water for the same small price a rational
human would, in normal circumstances choose the diamonds. If the same person found
themselves stranded and dying of thirst the rational choice would be reversed. Subjective
value theory thus relates value to the ability of the good to satisfy some desire or utility
[28]. In this model each agent has some internal method for assessing the value, or for
preference ordering goods, with respect to a satisfaction criteria. Hence through trading,
the individual value judgements of all agents participating in the market can influence the
value of a good.
The concept of scarcity and its relationship to utility has also been illustrated using the
diamond/water paradox. In the case of a person dying of thirst, if the water/diamond offer
is made again and again there will be a point at which the utility for water decreases below
that of diamonds and thus the diamonds will be chosen. As an agent acquires goods, the
value of having more of the same or similar goods may decrease to a point where there is
no net value for any further acquisition. This behaviour is described by the marginal value
theory, where each agent considers the goods currently owned in the subjective valuation
mechanism [11], [19]. This is the basis of utility or indifference curves, where the utility
of acquiring examples of a good tends toward zero as more are acquired. If an agent has
limited buying power in a market where two goods, A and B, are available for purchase, the
relative utility of acquiring good A over good B will reduce as the agent’s stocks of good A
increase. Even if the utility of good A is initially higher than that of good B, at some point
the utility gain of acquiring more of good A will be less than that of acquiring good B [18].
Thus for an agent to maximise utility this effect of marginal utility must be considered.
The effect of changes to agent’s preference ordering due to introduction of new goods,
scarcity, marginalisation or other influences will be reflected in the market price. This
has been used by a variety of multi-agent systems as a mechanism for cooperation and
task allocation. In general the agents receive rewards for tasks, which require expenditure
of finite agent resources. By forming an economy and trading tasks, global good is done
through each agent’s self interest while the competitive element enables competing local
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information to be dealt with in context of the team objective [9]. Typically the trade will
take the form of an auction such as in [3], [13], [17]and [20] with various mechanisms used to
conduct the auction. In [2], the auction is centralised with a master auctioneer setting the
reward for each task, the agents then bid to perform the tasks based on their estimated cost
of action. An extension to the task based auction is presented in [42] which allows auctioning
of roles or task abstractions in addition to task fragments. In [37] the centralised auctioneer
is used only to enter new tasks into the system with each agent able to hold a subsequent
auction for all or part of any task it is contracted to complete.
However, simply observing the value of the traded good does not provide details of the
internal valuation mechanism applied by an individual agent. Many techniques for learning
an agents utility are available such as indifference curves [18] or graph based methods in-
cluding the active utility elicitation in [4], [5]. Alternatives, which use market based schemes
such as [22], the attention bond used by [24] or the techniques based on buyer collusion
[27] also provide ways of finding agent utility. These methods use market observations to
uncover utility, however for the agent to participate in the market, or in the case of a multi-
agent system to also coordinate actions, the agent must still be designed with some suitable
internal valuation mechanism.
2.2 The Market Value of Information
While some research has suggested that in information markets with human agents trade
and value show similar trends to that of more material goods [34], traditional economic
models often have difficulty dealing with information as a commodity. This is due to the
intangible nature of information as a good and a number of unique attributes.
1. Information is abstract. While data is corporeal and readily measurable, information
relies on the understanding and interpretation of the consumer. A large amount of
data can be summarised by a concept and a single ideogram can stand in for an entire
collection of ideas.
2. The marginal cost of information gain may be low. Information can be cheap to
produce, have a negligible replication and distribution costs, and be cheap to store.
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Hence cost of information in isolation is unlikely to provide a good yard stick for
measuring the value of information to an agent.
3. Information is an experience good. The true value of a piece of information cannot be
known until it has been consumed or processed. Once consumed there is no further
value to be obtained from acquiring the same information and in general it cannot
be ‘unconsumed’. This leads to the so called inspection paradox [41]. Additionally
acquired information may be sold or distributed by the purchasing agent without
information loss.
4. Acquiring new information can invalidate information already owned. A physical tool
will continue to be able to perform its designed function even after the purchase of
newer or more efficient tools and thus will still have a measurable value in the market.
However if information is made obsolete due to the addition of new information, the
residual market value will be zero.
In [40] these characteristics are addressed by decomposing information value into three
components. The relevance, which indicates the extent the information relates to a decision
problem, utility the time function relating to the ability of the information to be able to
influence a decision and acceptance which relates to the agent’s ability to process information
given the current situation. Note that all three components have a temporal element.
Both the relevance and value of information to an agent have conditionality and limit
characteristics. The conditionality characteristic implies that information may only be
relevant and valuable in certain conditions, which may be defined by context or events.
As an example of event based relevance, if a security system can deploy a sensor to check
the integrity of doors, this information will be irrelevant if the building has burnt down.
For context based relevance in a homeland security type scenario, a person’s profession
will, in general, have little relevance or value in determining the terrorist threat posed.
However given that a person has bought a large quantity of ammonium nitrate the person’s
profession will be highly relevant in determining threat. The concept of conditionality is
partially captured in the objective theory of value through the marginal contribution of the
information to the agent’s goals.
Information relevance and value may have limits where the marginal value of information
may be zero above or below a certain level. For example, if a convoy of critical supplies has
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a particular pre-planned route, information may indicate the presence of hostile parties. If
the extent of the information only extends to presence then this may have no influence on
the configuration of the convoy or the route taken. However if the information indicates the
size and armament of hostile forces that may be encountered, then the route may be altered.
As an example of an upper limit of information value, localizing a target to greater accuracy
than the blast effects of the weapon being employed against it, will have no influence on
the decision of where to aim.
In [41] the author extends objective and marginal value theories to instrumental goods, such
as information. In the proposed valuation mechanism, a value is placed on the state the
agent is trying to reach and a path of intermediate states identified. If multiple paths exist
between states, then the Shapley value of coalition contribution can be used to allocate the
total value of the final state to all intermediate state. This implicitly captures conditionality
in information value, by formalising the relationship between different pieces of information
and allowing the formation of ‘infomation coalitions’ without which the desired state cannot
be reached. To be useful the goal and body of knowledge to be acquired must be well defined,
needing decomposition to a level that is manageable for computation. For scenarios where
highly abstract goal states may exist or the path between information states may be non-
linear, this may be problematic.
2.3 The Decision Problem and the Value of Information
If information is not free and an agent has finite resources, then the question of whether to
acquire new information becomes part of the decision agent’s decision problem. In classical
decision making problems the relative preference for action is encoded by a utility function.
This defines a gain for each outcome resulting from actions taken by the decision maker.
Except in the case of perfect knowledge, the deterministic utility function U(x, u), with u the
utility gain associated with a particular action when the world is in state x, is not especially
useful as the true state of the world is not known with precision and the true utility gain is
uncertain [16]. If a distribution P (x) summarises all the probabilistic information available
about the state x, then expected utility is the probabilistic estimate of the deterministic
utility.
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J (u) ∆= E{U(x, u)} =
∑
u∈U U(x, u)P (x|u) (2.1)
A rational decision maker will always select actions that maximise expected utility. The
utility function form, however says nothing about the nature of the actions or how they
become available to the decision maker, only the impact of an action on the state x is of
interest [8].
If an agent uses expected utility in decision making, then both the belief about the state
x and the impact of the action taken P (x|u) will influence the desirability of that action.
Thus any information which modifies the agents belief on x can be considered as having
value with respect to maximising utility. At the agent level, information value can then
be defined as the expected gain having the information compared to the expected gain not
having the information and then subtracting the cost of acquiring the information. This
concept is used as the basis for valuing information in [14], [31] and [38].
In the investigation of the utility of price information in [26] the utility is defined as the
expected cost saving in having a retailers price information. This is extended in [25] to
account for more abstract concepts like brand by applying monetary value when calcu-
lating utility. This approach determines the expected best price before and after price
information is purchased and uses the marginal utility as the decision variable for purchase.
However the limitation of using such a marginalisation approach is that characteristics of
price distributions in the market are assumed.
In information theoretic control the utility is related to the certainty of the estimate P (x)
[15], [31], thus the value of new information is implicitly correlated to its ability to reduce the
uncertainty about the true state of x. Using mutual information as the expected change in
the distribution after observation provides a way of predicting how the utility will be affected
prior to gaining information. Thus nothing is assumed a priori regarding the shape of the
distribution.
2.4 Other Information Value Metrics
Methods of valuing information based on content are fundamental in modern data mining
systems, notably internet search engines. Typically approaches such as word frequency [40],
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a learned model [1] or heuristic templates such as described in [10] are used by these search
engines to rank new information. While many of these algorithms are highly sophisticated,
the ranking applied is subjective, with the ranking of the information retrieved reflecting
the operator’s internal valuation if he or she has sufficient skill in phrasing the search query
for the given algorithm. In general, whatever the search engine algorithm, the objective
is to minimise the time taken to find information while maximising the probability that
the information returned is what the operator is looking for. This approach is not readily
extendable to multiple competing objectives or dynamic objectives.
In some applications the quality of the information is considered synonymous with value.
In [29] an operator ranks information sources based on quality, with this weighting used in
the fusion process. In other systems such as [12] and [32] the value of information is judged
according to its reliability based on trust criteria or corroboration with other information.
These information valuations do not consider the marginal or situational behaviour of the
value of information value.
2.5 Summary
Determining the value of market goods has been well researched in economics, however
many existing theories have some difficulty in relating value to an intangible good such as
information. Where the value of intangible goods has been examined, it has been suggested
that the value of information to an agent follows similar principles to other goods and
is subjective. The value being a function of both the agents internal priorities and the
perceived state of the world.
If an autonomous agent’s control mechanism can be represented by a gain based objective
function, then at each decision point, the reward gain will be impacted by both the agent’s
belief about the world, and the objective variables. Thus the value of information can be
described in terms of an objective function. While this is not new, it has not been well
understood in regard to autonomous control of multiple agents with competing objectives
and dynamic missions.
Chapter 3
The Value of Information
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter a value formulation based on utility and information entropy is applied to
the information gathering mission and extended to allow different information states to be
dealt with. The fundamental utility based value of information proposed by Sheridan is
outlined in Section 3.2 and then extended to the multivariate case in section 3.3. In Section
3.4, the information gathering scenario is introduced with the relevant information value
formulations shown.
3.2 Utility Based Value of Information
In [38], Sheridan formally defines information value as ‘the difference between the gain in
taking the best action given each specific state of a random variable x and the gain in taking
the best action knowing only P (x), minus the effort or other cost of discovering the truth
from the initial uncertain state.’
If a finite set of j actions is available to a decision making agent, the utility for performing
action uj conditioned on the random variable of interest being in state i is given by the
utility function U .
U(uj |xi) (3.1)
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If x has a finite set of possible states, the average utility gain for an agent taking the best
action for each occurrence of the state i is the average utility Uavg.
Uavg =
∑
i
P (xi){max
j
[U(uj |xi)]} (3.2)
For an agent to realise the average utility gain in Equation 3.2, the true state of x must be
known at each decision point. If the agent does not have perfect knowledge and P (x) sum-
marises all the probabilistic information available, then the agent’s gain for each occurrence
of the state i is the average expected utility gain U ′avg.
U ′avg = max
j
{
∑
i
P (xi)U(uj |xi)} (3.3)
The difference between the average utility and average expected utility represents the value
in utility units of determining the true state of x from the current P (x).
V ∗ = Uavg − U ′avg (3.4)
If the agent updates the belief P (x) by observing x then the additional information has
value with respect to utility gain. If a single observation z of x is made, then value of the
information in z is the difference between V ∗ before, \z, and after the observation.
Vz = V ∗\z − V ∗z (3.5)
The terms V ∗ and Vz provide general measures of information value that can be applied
whenever there is probabilistic representation of the variable of interest and a utility function
U is available.
In general, for an agent to make an observation and update P (x) requires the expenditure
of resources. Following the value of information in Equation 3.4 being described as the
difference in expected gain when knowing the true state of a variable and having an estimate
of its state, a natural description for the cost of information is the cost of determining the
true state of x from the current estimate P (x). If the cost of obtaining or processing new
information can be defined in terms of resource units expended per bit of information, then
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the expected cost of determining the true state of x or Cavg can be found using the entropy
of the distribution P (x).
Cavg = CH(x) (3.6)
= −C
∑
i
P (xi) logP (xi) (3.7)
The cost coefficient C will define the resources expended, such as time, fuel, dollars or
bandwidth. For resources other than bandwidth or computation time, the coefficient is
unlikely to be static and may be a function of some external variable or even the state of
interest itself C(x).
The net value of determining the true state of x is then found by subtracting the cost from
the value.
Vnet = V ∗ − Cavg (3.8)
In an uncertain world, multiple observations are likely to be required to provide a good
estimate of the true state of x. This makes defining the cost coefficient C difficult. A more
practical approach is to determine the cost of an individual or small set of observations. In
Equation 3.5 a portion of the total information value is apportioned to the information from
a single observation. Similarly the cost of a single observation can be defined as a function
of the difference between the cost of determining the true state of x before and after using
the information in z. The single observation cost coefficient, Cz can then be used.
Cz = Cz
(
H(x\z)−H(xz)
)
(3.9)
= −Cz
(∑
i
P (x\zi ) logP (x
\z
i )−
∑
i
P (xzi ) logP (x
z
i )
)
(3.10)
Equation 3.9 shows that for a constant Cz, only the change in entropy of the distribution
P (x) influences the cost of information.
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H(x\z)−H(xz) = H(x)−H(x|z)
∆= I(x; z) (3.11)
The mutual information, I(x; z), of the distributions P (x|z) and P (x) represents the ex-
pected change in the entropy after adding information from the observation.
I(x; z) = H(x)−H(x|z)
= H(z)−H(z|x) (3.12)
= H(x) +H(z)−H(x, z)
Where the distribution entropies can be found from the standard entropy equations.
H(.) = −
∑
i
P (.i) logP (.i) (3.13)
H(x, z) = −
∑
i
∑
j
P (xi, z) logP (xi, z) (3.14)
H(x|z) = −
∑
i
P (xi|z) logP (xi|z) (3.15)
H(z|x) = −
∑
i
P (z|xi) logP (z|xi) (3.16)
Hence if the sensor can be modelled by P (z|x), the mutual information can be determined
prior to the observation through the difference H(z) − H(z|x). In this case P (z) can be
determined through the total probability theorem shown in Equation 3.17.
Pz(z) =
∑
x
Px|z(z|x)Px(x) (3.17)
Substituting the mutual information into equation 3.9 gives a cost form that can be readily
determined.
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Cz = CzI(x; z) (3.18)
For each observation z that may be made, the expected net value of the information added
to the system is found by subtracting the single observation cost from the single observation
value.
V znet = Vz − Cz (3.19)
3.3 Value of Information for Multiple Variables
In Section 3.2 the state of interest in the agent’s utility function was represented by a single
random variable x. In a situation where the state of interest is best understood as a joint
distribution of multiple random variables, the agent’s utility will become a function of this
distribution. If four variables xt, xs, xc and xd determine the state of interest x then the
utility function from Equation 3.1 will become:.
U(uj |xti,xsl ,xcm,xdn) (3.20)
Similarly the agents average utility and expected average utility will take the joint distri-
bution form.
Uavg =
∑
i
∑
l
∑
m
∑
n
P (xti,x
s
l ,x
c
m,x
d
n){max
j
[U(uj |xti,xsl ,xcm,xdn)]} (3.21)
U ′avg = max
l
{
∑
i
∑
j
∑
m
∑
n
P (xti,x
s
l ,x
c
m,x
d
n)U(uj |xti,xsl ,xcm,xdn)} (3.22)
For the multivariate case, the information value functions retain the forms shown in Equa-
tions 3.4 and 3.5. The information cost will take the joint distribution form of Equation
3.9 and the information cost for a single observation will use the mutual information of the
joint distribution.
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Cz = Cz
(∑
i
∑
l
∑
m
∑
n
P (xtzi ,x
sz
l ,x
cz
m ,x
dz
n ) log{P (xtzi ,xszl ,xczm ,xdzn )}
−
∑
i
∑
l
∑
m
∑
n
P (xt\zi ,x
s\z
l ,x
c\z
m ,x
d\z
n ) log{P (x\zi ,xs\zl ,xc\zm ,xd\zn )}
)
(3.23)
Cz = CzI(xti,x
s
l ,x
c
m,x
d
n; z) (3.24)
Equation 3.24 assumes that the function defining the cost per bit of information is the same
across all the states being observed. If this is not the case then the cost coefficient should
reflect this by being a function of all the variables of interest Cz(xti,x
s
l ,x
c
m,x
d
n).
3.4 The Multi-Objective Scenario
In an example scenario, there are a number of assets, both mobile and static, that need to
be protected as part of ongoing security operation in an urban environment. An unknown
number of ground vehicles are in the area, some of which may pose a threat to the assets.
An information gathering system consisting of a number of sensor equipped mobile agents
is available to provide information about vehicles within the area of operation. This in-
formation is provided to security resources, which can then deploy to counter any threats.
If security resources are limited, being unable to provide protection to all assets at once,
then the efficiency of the security response will be determined by what is known prior to
deployment regarding the nature and location of any threats.
As an information gathering resource, the agent’s primary objective is to maximise informa-
tion regarding threats in order to facilitate an efficient security response. In support of this
objective the agent’s tasks can be decomposed: to find targets, determine whether they are
a threat and once identified as a threat, to maintain an estimate of current location. This
can be considered as the multi-objective mission: search for targets, classify targets and
track targets. For each planning cycle the agent’s decision problem is to determine which
observation/s should be made in order to provide the most informative threat picture.
The current threat picture will be some function of the proximity of all ground vehicles to
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the protected assets, the types of target and hence the threat posed, and the uncertainty
regarding the vehicles true position. As the number and type of ground vehicles is initially
unknown, the utility gain for the observation z will contain the variables:
− xt, indicating the existence of a known or tracked vehicle in the observation
− xc, the classification of the tracked vehicle observed
− xl, the relative proximity of the tracked vehicle to all assets
− xs, indicating the existence of a previously unknown vehicle in the observation
− xd, the classification of the unknown vehicle
− xλ, the relative proximity of the unknown vehicle to all assets
Intuitively it may be expected that vehicles considered to pose a significant threat will try
to reach the assets being protected and thus are more likely to be found near or heading
towards these assets. Further, if the vehicles are cooperating then there will be a correlation
between the locations of all those cooperating.
P (xt|xc) 6= P (xt) (3.25)
P (xs|xd) 6= P (xs)
P (xt|xs) 6= P (xt) (3.26)
P (xs|xt) 6= P (xs)
This has implications for both the tracking algorithm and the information value functions.
To avoid the complex inference required to determine the level of co-operation between
targets, for the purposes of this study it has been assumed that ground vehicle actions are
independent and that vehicle type and location are independent given the existence of the
vehicle. Where the threat primarily comes from a single vehicle which is difficult to dis-
tinguish from civilian traffic, this assumption is reasonable. The independence assumption
allows the utility function in Equation 3.20 to be the sum of the independent utilities as in
Equation 3.27. In this case the action u is taking the observation z and 1..j is the set of
possible points in the area that may be observed.
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U(uj |xt,xs,xc,xd,xl,xλ) = U(uj |xt,xc)+U(uj |xt,xl)+U(uj |xs,xd)+U(uj |xs,xλ) (3.27)
For a set of q tracked targets and a single undetected target in the observation, the utility of
observing this state can be found via the value, v, which is assigned to each of the true states
of x as part of the mission setup. Equation 3.28 shows the observation utility determined
from value of the x states observed.
U(uj |xt,xs,xc,xd,xl,xλ) =
∑
q
vlq +
∑
q
vcq + v
λ + vd (3.28)
The current belief on each of the variables of interest, either maintained directly or accessed
by the agent, is used to calculate the average and expected utility for the next observation
z. Due to the independence assumption, the Equations 3.21 and 3.22 can be applied to find
the utility of z, as per Equations 3.29 and 3.30 with the value for each state found from
Equation 3.28.
Uavg =
∑
i
∑
m
P (xli,x
c
m,x
t
m) max
j
U(uj |xli,xcm,xtm)+
∑
l
∑
n
P (xλl ,x
d
n,x
s
n) max
j
U(uj |xλl ,xdn,xsn)
(3.29)
U ′avg = max
j
∑
i
∑
m
P (xli,x
c
m,x
t
m)U(uj |xli,xcm,xtm)+max
j
∑
l
∑
n
P (xλl ,x
d
n,x
s
n)U(uj |xλl ,xdn,xsn)
(3.30)
Where i and l are the summations across all possible locations and m and n the summations
across all possible types for the tracked and untracked vehicles respectively.
The probability of the classification of an undetected target cannot be extracted from the
observable belief states unless a prior belief on the target type distribution is available. In
line with the assumption that nothing is known a priori regarding the targets in the area
or indeed the existence of potential targets, a flat distribution across all target types can
be used. Once a target has been observed a distribution of classification probabilities for
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the target can be generated and hence the undetected target distribution over N possible
target types will remain naive.
P (xd) =
1
N
(3.31)
Where N is the number of distinct target types.
For the case of multiple known targets being present in the observation, the Equations 3.29
and 3.30 need to reflect the joint distribution of the tracked target classifications. If the
assumption of independent target behaviour holds then Equations 3.21 and 3.33 will apply
for q targets which have a probability of appearing in the observation.
Uavg =
∑
i
∑
m
P (xli1 ,x
c
m1 ,x
t
m1) maxj
U(uj |xli1 ,xcm1 ,xtm1) + . . .
+
∑
i
∑
m
P (xliq ,x
c
mq ,x
t
mq) maxj
U(uj |xliq ,xcmq ,xtmq)
+
∑
l
∑
n
P (xλl ,x
d
n,x
s
n) max
j
U(uj |xλl ,xdn,xsn) (3.32)
U ′avg = max
j
∑
i
∑
m
P (xli1 ,x
c
m1 ,x
t
m1)U(uj |xli1 ,xcm1 ,xtm1) + . . .
+ max
j
∑
i
∑
m
P (xliq ,x
c
mq ,x
t
mq)U(uj |xliq ,xcmq ,xtmq)
+ max
j
∑
l
∑
n
P (xλl ,x
d
n,x
s
n)U(uj |xλl ,xdn,xsn) (3.33)
In the scenario presented, the primary cost to the agent in making an observation is the
resources expended in manoeuvering to a position to allow the best observation z. In this
case Cz is a function of the spatial parameters of z and is most appropriately measured in
time, fuel or distance units. As the cost is independent of the information gained, the cost of
the observation is used directly rather than the cost per bit formulation shown in Equation
3.18. If the agent performs an observation or set of observation actions each planning cycle
then only the relative cost of each potential action is of interest in determining V znet.
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3.5 Summary
In this chapter a scheme for valuing different information types has been presented. The
value process considers both human judgements, the state of the world observed and the
current information state. The information valuation scheme is applied to the specific
multi-objective scenario of security and asset protection in an urban environment. Chapter
4 outlines a complete system architecture for applying information value to the control of
a heterogeneous sensor network for the security scenario.
Chapter 4
Architecture
4.1 Introduction
Control of a number of sensor platforms based on the value of information outlined in
Section 3.4 was implemented in a mid-fidelity simulation environment. The system was
originally developed for testing algorithms and architectures for the co-operative control of
a system of heterogeneous airborne sensor platforms tracking ground targets in an urban
environment. The architecture of the simulator is modular allowing components complying
with the interface standard to be inserted or removed with relative ease.
This section provides a brief outline of the original architecture, followed by the modifica-
tions for decentralised control and the implementation of information value in controlling
the platforms. The implementation of the modules relevant to the information value based
control scheme is then detailed.
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4.2 Multi-Objective System Architecture
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Figure 4.1: The basic simulator framework.
The simulator and architecture were conceived as a possible solution to the problem of
single operator control of multiple autonomous platforms supporting an urban security
mission. The original architecture is based on centralised processing of sensor information
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with a central control loop to determine waypoints that are then passed to each platform
for autonomous execution.
The complete system framework, shown in Figure 4.1, is an amalgamation of distinct control
and fusion functionalities. The control domain is based on Saradis’s framework for the
principle of Increasing Precision with Decreasing Intelligence (IPDI)[36]. Control is task
based, with discrete tasks being allocated to available resources. In line with the concept
of IPDI, the higher the level of control, the more abstract the task description. Passing a
high level task such as Search down through the Organize, Coordinate, Execute refinement
processes, results in the task being described at the lowest level in terms of a path for a
platform/sensor combination. Execution of the path by the agents causes information gain
which feeds into the fusion domain as sensor returns or observations.
The fusion domain is layered according to the levels described in the JDL Data fusion model
[23]. Information enters the fusion domain at the lowest level as raw sensor observations
and is refined to generate an estimate of the state of the world. The fusion and control
domains interact at two points, corresponding to the JDL descriptions of Level 3 and 4 Data
Fusion. At Level 3 or ‘situation assessment ’ a mission state is derived from the estimate
of the world state. This can be used to evaluate the utility of performing any task. In this
framework Level 4 Data Fusion, or ‘process refinement ’, is an implicit part of the Human
Robot Interface. The operator has access to the output of the fusion components via the
Information Customer Interface, thus human level information assessment and abstract
reasoning for control refinement may be performed by the operator. This information
is implicit in the operator’s mission specification and enters the system via the situation
assessment level.
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4.2.2 Distributed Control
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Figure 4.2: The distributed control simulator framework.
The Distributed Control architecture shown in Figure 4.2 is a modification of that in Figure
4.1, where higher level control decisions are deferred to the agents. In order to support this,
the Mission Planning and Task Allocation components are on board each agent. In this
case for the team to be coordinated a negotiation module is added to each agent to permit
inter-agent communication. If each agent communicates it’s best task assignment and the
utility to other agents, then the allocation for maximum team utility can be negotiated.
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The fusion domain is shared with the centralised architecture in Figure 4.1. The single point
of fusion and dissemination ensures that agents have a common belief state on which to make
decisions. However for each agent planning cycle the Belief, B, needs to be communicated
to each agent via the Dispatcher along with the Mission.
4.2.3 Information Value Based Control
Value Map
Path Planning
Observations
Forward 
Propagation
Process 
Models
Current 
Belief State
Future Belief 
State
Belief
Level 1 Data Fusion
Level 2 Data Fusion
Level 4 Data Fusion
The ‘World’
Execution Level
ControlInformation
Operator Control
Human Robot Interface
Information 
Customer
1u
P
1..r
kz
:1( | )k kP zx
1( | )k kP −x x
1( )kP +x
( )P x
fb
kx
1X
,Γ Π
Dispatcher
Vehicle 
Controller
Vehicle 
Controller
iu
...
UAV Sim 
Interface
UAV Sim
Interface
Real-time UAV and Sensor Simulator
Ground 
Vehicles
Sensor 
Interface
Sensor 
Interface
...
r
kz
1
kz
ClassificationTrackingSearch
Fusion
B
 Assisted Belief 
Management
Augmented 
Belief State
ab
Learned
 Models
cb
Path Planning
Platform/
Sensor 
Models
,Γ Π
Platform/
Sensor 
Models
...
...
...
iX
Value Map
Threat Map
Negotiation 
Module
Negotiation 
Module
Value Based Control
Figure 4.3: The information value based control simulator framework.
4.3 Components 27
The Information Value architecture shown in Figure 4.3 is a further modification of the
Distributed Control architecture. Again fusion components are shared and centralised,
however Level 3 Fusion, Organisation and Coordination are collapsed into a single level.
The belief state is used to generate a common ‘Threat Map’, which implicitly captures the
system goals. The Threat Map is used by each agent to generate an information value map
on which all agent decisions are based. A negotiation module is added to maximise the
value of information by ensuring information is not duplicated. However negotiation is not
used for all information value based control schemes as outlined in Section 5.2.4.
4.3 Components
4.3.1 Human Robot Interface
The Human Robot Interface (HRI) consists of two components, the Information Customer
Interface and the Operator Control Interface. The architecture separates these functionali-
ties for command and control purposes, allowing information dissemination by distributing
copies of the Information Customer Interface while maintaining single point of mission
control.
The link between the Operator Control Interface and Information Customer Interface pro-
vides a bridge between the information and control domains at the human level. This allows
for active inference, planning and refinement at the abstract Level 4 Data Fusion level.
4.3.2 Level 0 and 1 Data Fusion
At the Level 0 Data Fusion level raw sensor signals are associated to target features and
Level 1 Data Fusion associates these features to an entity and provides an entity state
estimate. In the simulated system both Level 1 and 2 processes are performed within the
various sensor modules, producing an observation z as output. Appendix A details this
process.
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4.3.3 System Belief
The complete system belief state, B, is constructed from a number of components.
B = f(bc, bf , ba) (4.1)
− bc is the belief about the current state of the world.
− bf is the belief about the future state of the world.
− ba is an augmented belief state resulting from additional high level input from a human
or through inference or learning.
Each b is the joint distribution of the variables of interest, which for the security scenario
is the components of P (x).
b = f(P (xt,xc,xs,xd)) (4.2)
Where P (xt) is the track distribution over the area of operation for all targets being tracked,
P (xs) is the search state over the area of operation, P (xc) is the classification distribution
for all targets being tracked and P (xd) is the distribution associated with the classification
of any undetected target.
According to the JDL fusion model, the complete belief state contains elements belonging
to both Level 2 and 3 data fusion. By fusing sensor observations with prior information,
the current belief bc provides situation assessment, or Level 2 fusion, through the track,
classification and search modules. These are detailed in appendix A. If the actions of the
agent and their effect on the estimate of the world states are considered, then the future
belief bf provides impact assessment which is considered part of Level 3 fusion.
The current belief bc is characterised at time k by P (xk), which summarises all the proba-
bilistic information available about x from the observation history z0, ...zk−1. In the scenario
the observation history applies only to xc, xt and xs, as P (xd) is assumed constant.
If target classification is such that it describes an intrinsic property of the target object
then P (xck) = P (x
c
k−1), if zk−1 contains no information about x
c. However if the targets
are mobile, then this relationship does not hold for xt or xs. Thus, due to the small size
of the area associated with a single observation relative to the area of operation, P (xt) and
P (xs) will necessarily be predicted to time k if no observation has been made at k− 1. The
predicted state may be obtained by the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation.
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P (xtk|zt1:k−1) =
∫
P (xtk|xtk−1)P (xtk−1|zt1:k−1)dxtk−1 (4.3)
Where P (xtk|xtk−1) is a probabilistic Markov motion model. In the case of xt this is the
actual target motion model, which will be conditioned on target type P (xtk|xtk−1,xck−1), and
for xs this term will be the motion model for an unknown target type.
With the target classification, P (xc), invariant with respect to time if no observation is
made, the future belief bf at time k + n is characterised only by P (xtk+n) and P (x
s
k+n).
Using the same motion model as Equation 4.3, a prediction of P (x) can be made for some
arbitrary future time. The forward predict time is driven by the planning cycle of the agents.
In the task based control implementation the world states are predicted forward according
to Equation 4.3 as part of the process of determining the best path for the assigned task.
Incorporating the impact of agent actions is discussed below.
4.4 Level 3 Data Fusion
The product of Level 3 fusion is the estimate of the situation utility [23]. The Level 3 process
involves assessing the likely impact of future agent actions and evaluating the situation with
respect to the mission objectives.
For the task based control architecture, both the state of the world and the mission con-
tribute to defining task priority. Thus Level 3 data fusion includes a mapping of the mission
goals and current state of the world to prioritised system goals.
L3 : B ×M → A,P (4.4)
− B is the current system belief state generated from all available information.
− M is the mission description for the whole system defined by the human operator.
− A is a set of system tasks described by M .
− P is the set of priorities for all tasks.
To assess the impact of the agent’s actions on the future belief state, a fixed time horizon
corresponding the agent’s replan cycle is used. For the task based control system the tasks
are prioritised according to the mapping in Equation 4.4, leaving the relative impact of
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the observation action in completing the task as the remaining component for determining
situation utility. This is determined by assessing the mutual information of the agent’s
sensor and the task’s state variable. This is detailed in Appendix B
For the information value based control system, the likely impact of the observation zk+1
directly on all states of interest is used to assess future agent actions with respect to the
mission. The situation utility is determined by comparing the value of world state prior
to the observation P (xk) and post the observation P (xk+2), with one step look ahead
prediction of target tracks. The future belief state bf at the planning horizon k+ 1 and the
Chapman-Kolmogorov Equation 4.3, provide the basis for determining P (xk+2|zk+1) This
is detailed in Section 5.2.
4.4.1 Execution
The Execution Level is where physical control of the platforms and sensors is carried out.
The assigned task a or desired observation z is used to generate inputs for the platform
controllers, via a path planner or other guidance system. The platform controllers, which
in the case of a UAV will be the navigation module and autopilot, then execute the path
using feedback from the simulated world regarding the vehicle’s motion and position.
The framework shown in Figure 4.1, shows the Path Planner component above the Dis-
patcher, with only the final path or way point passed to the platform. This arrangement is
suitable for sensor platforms having minimal onboard processing and no inter-platform com-
munication. With increased processing power and communications ability the Path Planner
may be moved onboard, with centralised control maintained if the Dispatcher simply passes
details of a to the relevant platform.
Path Planning
A path appropriate for the assigned platform must be generated that satisfies the require-
ments for either accomplishing the task a or observing the area specified by z. This applies
whether the path planning component is on board the platform or residing in the ground
station. The separation of task allocation and path planning allows flexibility in the path
planning algorithms used without impacting the higher levels of control. Further, in the
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case of task based control, it allows the Coordinator to operate with only limited knowledge
regarding details of the platforms being controlled.
In the task based systems the assigned task a will normally be associated with an area for
the time k + 1. Thus the Path Planning component generates a platform specific optimal
path in order to provide sensor coverage for a. If a single task requires coordination between
multiple platforms, determining the group optimum path may require multiple iterations of
the individual path planners. If the planner resides in the platform the ability to send and
receive information about the path between platforms is necessary for successful execution.
Various constraints such as fuel usage or manoeuvre limits may result in the path planner
being unable to generate a valid path within the cost budget allocated to the task. The
framework includes a feed back mechanism between the Task Allocation and Path Plan-
ning modules to allow the task to be returned to the Coordinator where the task set A is
reallocated.
In the information value framework the observation zk+1 is defined by the point s in the
area of operation to be observed. Hence the Path Planning component generates an optimal
path for the platform to point its sensor at a point of interest. Assuming that all parts of
the map are accessible and given that an estimate of the cost of taking the observation is
explicitly included in the value formulation, the feed back mechanism, although included in
the architecture, should not be used in practice.
4.5 Summary
This chapter has outlined a general architecture for the co-operative control of a system of
heterogeneous airborne sensor platforms tracking ground targets. Use is made of the concept
of data fusion levels and the principle of Increasing Precision with Decreasing Intelligence.
The general framework is modular and flexible with task and information value based control
both being able to be used within the same system architecture. Chapter 5 details the
implementation of the system architecture with an information value based control scheme
derived from the formulations in Chapter 3.
Chapter 5
Implementation
5.1 Introduction
The implementation of the value based control formulation outlined in Chapter 3 using the
architecture described in Chapter 4 is presented in 5.2, with the corresponding implemen-
tation of the task based control used for comparison detailed in Appendix B.
At every planning cycle, each agent calculates its own value map for the security scenario,
as shown in Section 5.2.3, from the common threat map described in Section 5.2.2. The
value map is used to determine the value of an observation V znet according to the control
schemes described in section 5.2.4 and their associated cost functions in Section 5.2.5.
Section 5.3 details the metrics used for comparison of the value based control and the task
based control schemes. The specifics of the scenarios used for comparison are shown in
Section 6.1, with results presented in Section 6.4.
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5.2 Value Based Control
5.2.1 Priority
The priority p of either a ground vehicle or asset is used as the basis of preference ordering
for both the task based and value based controllers. In the value based control, the priority
is used to determine the value of the observation z, while in task based control it is used to
determine the weighting for a discrete task as detailed in Appendix B.
The priority of a ground vehicle is given by the set Pc, which differentiates based on the
threat posed by the particular type.
Pc = K [pc1, pc2 . . . pcm] (5.1)
Where there are m distinguishable ground vehicle types and K may be a normalising value
or other equivalence term such that comparison can be made with other priority sets active
in the system. In the simulated system, the target type priority is applied by the operator
according to one of the descriptions shown below. A numerical value corresponding to the
human level description is then automatically applied.
pm = |No Impact, Some Impact, Desirable, Highly Desirable, Mission Critical| (5.2)
It is desirable that the values corresponding to each descriptive level are either assigned by
a human with high level knowledge of the situation or extracted from historical data. In the
scenarios investigated, the corresponding numerical values are applied as either the linear
set 1 . . . 5 or the logarithmic set 21 . . . 25. Similar priority descriptions and numerical values
are used for asset priority. This same basic priority description is used as a foundation for
both task based and value based systems.
5.2.2 Threat Map
As discussed in Section 3.4, in the urban security scenario the information gathering agent’s
observation utility is a function of the variables corresponding to ground vehicle type, cur-
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rent position estimate and proximity to protected assets. Information on all states of interest
is gained through placing the footprint of the agent’s sensor over a section of the area of op-
eration and making an observation. This allows the asset proximity variable for the current
planning cycle to be fixed if the two dimensional space of the area of operation is used as an
anchor for the belief states and value functions. This gives rise to the ‘threat map’ which
describes U(uj |xl,λ). If the observation action uj is similarly anchored, with j describing a
subset x of the area of operation, then a ‘value map’ can be created which will indicate the
expected value of observing any point in the area of operation. Defining x as a point area,
the utility for uj=x is then a function of the variables xt, xc, xs and xd.
The threat map is determined by a combination of the asset properties and the relative
location of all assets. Each asset will have an associated mission priority pa1 applied as in
Equation 5.2 and a vulnerability to threat v1. For the point x, the contribution of asset
m is found by using one of the threat function shown in Equations 5.3 to 5.6. The total
threat at any point x is the sum over all a where a ∈ A is the set of all assets and xa is the
location of asset a.
pl,λ(x) = pae
−0.5
(
(xa−x)2
νa
)
(5.3)
pl,λ(x) = pa
(
1− 1
ηνa
|xa − x|
)
(5.4)
pl,λ(x) =
 pa for |xa − x| < ηνa0 for |xa − x| > ηνa (5.5)
pl,λ(x) =
 pa for x ∈ S0 for x /∈ S (5.6)
Equations 5.3 and 5.4 allow the operator to assign potential threat based on the distance
of a target from the asset. In Equation 5.3 a log decreasing threat function is applied
centered on the asset and in 5.4 the threat decreases linearly with distance from the target.
Equation 5.5 sets a constant threat within the specified distance from the asset. The η
value is the vulnerability limit distance, beyond which a target poses no threat to the asset.
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The numerical values for pa are as for the type priority and the vulnerability of asset, va,
is applied by the operator according to the human specified levels in Equation 5.7.
In Equation 5.6, the set S is a group of points or nodes specified by the operator and
allows manual setting of the priority of the area around an asset. This provides flexibility
for assigning a threat area of any shape, which can be used by the operator to reflect
vulnerability for different avenues of approach to the asset. This assignment of threat to
a set of points is also used in the Mission setup for task based control and is described in
Appendix B.
v = |Soft, Reinforced, Hardened, Fortified, Protected| (5.7)
The values corresponding to each vulnerability level relate to a ‘safe’ distance. This is the
minimum distance at which a security response will be able to neutralise any threat posed
by a ground vehicle without substantial damage to the asset. In this case Soft corresponds
to 150m and Protected to 10m.
5.2.3 State Utility
As the information gathering component of the security mission, the primary task of the
agents is to provide information regarding potential threats to ensure they are effectively
countered. Hence the observation utility for an agent will be a function of both the state
of the ground vehicles observed and the current information state. This is supported by
the intuition that for a vehicle of known type, an observation will be more valuable if the
current position estimate is poor than if the vehicles position is known precisely.
If maximum entropy provides maximum gain, then combining the information state with
the target state provides the observation utility for each of the variables of interest. The
observation utility conditioned on the true type and location is shown in Equations 5.8 and
5.9 for the point x.
vlx = p
l
x
H(xt)
Hmax(xt)
+ pc
H(xt)
Hmax(xt)
(5.8)
vc = pc
H(xc)
Hmax(xc)
(5.9)
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Where H(xt) is the current track entropy associated with target q, which has a track
distribution that includes the point x and Hmax(xt) is the maximum dispersion of P (xt)
before the target is considered not to be in track. This is detailed in Appendix A. Similarly
H(xc) is the entropy associated with the current vehicle type estimate, with Hmax(xc) being
the entropy of a flat distribution of all possible target types.
As nothing is know regarding any untracked vehicles in the observation, the current entropy
of xt and xc can be considered as Hmax. Hence the observation utilities for the untracked
target at point x is simply equal to the priority as shown in Equation 5.10 and 5.11.
vλx = p
λ (5.10)
vd = pd (5.11)
The maximum utility prior to observation z of point x is then found in Equation 5.12 by
substitution.
U(uj=x|x) = U(uj=x|xt,xc,xl) + U(uj=x|xs,xd,xl=λ)
=
∑
q
vlx,q +
∑
q
vcx,q + v
l
x + v
d
x (5.12)
The observation utility for point x conditioned on the best knowledge that sensor r can
obtain of a target is then found by substituting Equation 5.13 for 5.8 and Equation 5.14 for
5.9.
v
′l
x = p
l
xP (z
t
x|xtx)
H(xtx)
Hmax(xtx)
+ pcP (zc|xc) H(x
t
x)
Hmax(xtx)
(5.13)
v
′c = pcqP (z
c|xc) H(x
c)
Hmax(xc)
(5.14)
Similarly for the unknown vehicle, Equations 5.10 and 5.11 are modified based on the
estimated state of the world.
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v
′λ
x = p
λP (xtx) (5.15)
v
′d
x = p
dP (xc) (5.16)
The average utility prior to observation z of point x is then found in Equation 5.17 by
substitution.
U ′(uj=x|x) =
∑
q
v
′l
x,q +
∑
q
v
′c
x,q + v
′l
x + v
′d
x (5.17)
The value of V ∗\z can then be found for x from Equation 3.4.
V ∗\k = Uavg − U
′
avg
=
∑
i
P (xi)U(uj=x|x)−
∑
i
P (xi)U ′(uj=x|x) (5.18)
Where Uavg and U ′avg can be found from the summation of the observation utility over all
possible vehicle types for all tracked and unknown targets.
∑
i
P (xi)U(uj=x|x) =
∑
m
P (xtx1)P (x
c
m1)U(uj=x|xtx1 ,xcm1 ,xlx) + · · ·
+
∑
m
P (xtxq)P (x
c
mq)U(uj=x|xtxq ,xcmq ,xlx)
+
∑
n
P (xsx)P (x
d
n)U(uj=x|xsx,xdn,xλx) (5.19)
The probability of the existence of the tracked target P (xt) at x is obtained from the track
estimate, the type estimate P (xc) for the tracked target is provided by the classification
distribution and the probability P (xs) of a previously undetected target at x is obtained
from the search state. See Appendix A for the implementation of the search, track and
classify belief states. Note that with no a priori knowledge, P (xdn) will be constant.
If sensor r makes observation zr that includes information about a target then the resulting
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observation utilities for the point x can be found by substituting the post observation
entropy into Equations 5.8, 5.9, 5.13 and 5.14.
vlx = p
l
x
H(xtx|zr)
Hmax(xtx)
+ pc
H(xtx|zr)
Hmax(xtx)
(5.20)
vc = pc
H(xc|zr)
Hmax(xc)
(5.21)
v
′l
x = p
l
xP (z
t
x|xtx, zr)
H(xtx|zr)
Hmax(xtx)
+ pcP (zc|xc) H(x
t
x|zr)
Hmax(xtx)
(5.22)
v
′c = vcqP (z
c|xc, zr) H(x
c|zr)
Hmax(xc)
(5.23)
The post observation entropy can be found prior to the observation being made via mutual
information.
H(xtx|zr) = H(xtx)− I(xtx, ztr) (5.24)
H(xcx|zr) = H(xcx)− I(xcx, zcr) (5.25)
Where I is found using Equations 3.12, 3.13 and 3.14. The joint probability of target states
and the observation is found using the sensor model of sensor r.
P (xt, ztr)P (z
t
r|xt)⊗ P (xt) (5.26)
P (xc, zcr)P (z
c
r|xc)⊗ P (xc) (5.27)
For the unknown target vλx and v
d remain as for Equations 5.10 and 5.11, while the v′ values
for the unknown target are shown in Equations 5.28 and 5.29.
v
′λ
x = p
λP (xtx, zr) (5.28)
v
′d
x = p
dP (xc, zr) (5.29)
These values of v found from Equations 5.20 to 5.29 can be substituted into Equations 5.12
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and 5.17 to give Uz(uj=x|x, zg) and U ′z(uj=x|x, zg) respectively.
To find V ∗z , the joint distributions in Equations 5.26 and 5.27 are used for the estimate of
the state after observation z.
V ∗z = Uzavg − U
′z
avg
=
∑
i
∑
m
P (xi, zg)UZ(uj=x|x, zm)−
∑
i
∑
g
P (xi, zg)U ′z(uj=x|x, zg) (5.30)
Hence for q ground vehicles having a probability of being point x and g possible type
observations:
∑
i
∑
g
P (xi, zg)Uz(uj=x|x, zg) =
∑
g
∑
m
P (xtx1 , z
t
x)P (x
c
m1 , z
c
g)Uz(uj=x|xtx1 ,xcm1 ,xlx, zg) + · · ·
+
∑
g
∑
m
P (xtxq , z
t
x)P (x
c
mq , z
c
g)Uz(uj=x|xtxq ,xcmq ,xlx, zg)
+
∑
n
P (xsx, z
s
x)P (x
d
n)Uz(uj=x|xsx,xdn,xλx) (5.31)
The complete action set for the agent is the set of observations for all points in the area of
operation, or x ∈ S. By determining V ∗ for each point, a value map for each sensor can be
created. The complete observation value Vnet can be found from this map by subtracting the
cost of placing the sensor to observe the area defined by x. The cost will be dependent on
control issues such how the value map is used and the planning horizon, which is discussed
in Sections 5.2.5 and 5.2.4.
5.2.4 Planning and Control
Three different control schemes were used in the implementation of value based control, In-
finite Horizon Peak-chasing (IHP), Finite Horizon Peak-chasing (FHP) and Finite Horizon
Footprint (FHF). These are compared to the Task based control scheme in Appendix B as
a performance benchmark.
In the IHP control scheme, at each planning cycle the agent chooses a waypoint which
allows observation of the point x where the Vnet map shows maximum value. This point is
5.2 Value Based Control 40
passed to all other agents, and if two or more agents have selected an observation point x
within 20m of each other, new observation points are chosen in a pareto optimal fashion.
In the FHP control scheme, as in IHP, the agent chooses a waypoint which allows observation
of the point x where the Vnet map shows maximum value. However the point chosen is
limited by a 30o arc either side of the agents direction of travel, with a radius equal to the
maximum distance the agent can travel before the next planning cycle. This is shown in
Figure 5.2. In FHP, nothing is communicated between the agents. The area considered
is shown in Figure 5.2, with the point of maximum value within this area chosen as the
waypoint for the next planning cycle.
Figure 5.1: The Finite Horizon Peak chasing control scheme for a 5 second look ahead
planning horizon. A waypoint for the current planning cycle is chosen from within the 30o
arc highlighted in blue.
The FHF control scheme uses the same path planning mechanism as the task based con-
trol system discussed in Appendix B. A set of potential sensor footprints is found at the
planning horizon, and the set of points s contained in each footprint found. The value of
the observation is then
∑
x∈s
Vxnet. The waypoint corresponding to maximum value is then
chosen for the current planning cycle. The predicted footprints for a 5 second look ahead
planning cycle are shown in Figure 5.2.
The predicted footprints are based on predicting a set of fixed bank angles from the current
pose. As a result of the UAV needing to reach the desired bank angle, the actual footprint
at the horizon will differ somewhat from that predicted at the beginning of the planning
cycle. Figure 5.3 shows the difference between the footprints predicted at the beginning of
the planning cycle and the actual footprint at the end of the planning cycle.
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Figure 5.2: The Finite Horizon Footprint chasing control scheme for a 5 second look ahead
planning horizon. Predicted footprints are shown in light green with the dark green indi-
cating the current footprint. The UAV bank angle control associated with the footprint
providing the best
∑
x∈s
Vxnet is chosen for the current planning cycle.
Figure 5.3: Actual footprint at the end of the planning cycle shown in dark green, with
predicted footprints shown in light green as per Figure 5.2. Note the actual footprint is
similar but not identical to the footprint selected for control.
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5.2.5 The Observation Cost
As discussed in Section 3.4 the cost coefficient is independent of the information contained
in the observation and dependent on the parameters of z. In the case of IHP, the cost is a
function of the distance from the agents current position to the chosen point on the map,
x and the agents current speed.
Czx =
∣∣X¯x − x¯∣∣Xv (5.32)
Where Xv is the agent’s velocity along the heading axis and Xx the current location.
At each time step the agent makes an observation. As FHP determines the value of observing
points at the planning horizon, ie within a constant number of time steps, it is assumed
that each observation action consumes the same resources. Hence no cost is applied and
the V ∗ map used directly.
For FHF control the cost is applied as a function of the agents state at the planning horizon
k. This penalises extreme manoeuvres and large control inputs.
Czs = X
c
φ −Xkφ (5.33)
Where Xφ is the agent’s bank angle.
5.3 Evaluation Metrics
A number of metrics are used for evaluating performance and for comparison between the
task based and information value based control schemes.
5.3.1 Threat Measures
The first of these is the threat measure T . The threat is derived from the utility functions
outlined in Section 5.2.3. The threat posed by tracked target T is shown in Equation 5.34.
Tq =
H∑
i=1
C∑
m=1
P (xti,x
c
m)v
l
i,m +
C∑
m=1
P (xcm)v
c (5.34)
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The overall threat measure can then be found using Equation 5.35.
T =
S∑
s=1
P (xss)v
λ
s +
C∑
m=1
P (xdm)v
d
m +
Q∑
q=1
Tq (5.35)
As described in Section 5.2.3, for the information gathering system the threat is a function
of both the true state of the world and in the information available. This is reflected in
the threat measures in Equations 5.34 and 5.35. The threat conditioned solely on the true
world state is the true threat Tt shown in Equation 5.36.
Tt =
Q∑
q=1
xtxp
l
x + x
c
mp
c
m (5.36)
− The set Q is all ground vehicles currently in the area of operation both tracked and
untracked.
− x is the true position of ground vehicle q at the current time.
− m is the true ground vehicle type.
5.3.2 Entropy
The entropy of the distributions maintained as part of the belief state B provides a set of
metrics on which comparison of the different control schemes can be made. However the
entropy alone fails to capture the relative priority of the distributions. As a result both
the entropy and a measure termed the weighted entropy Hw are used for comparison. The
weighted entropy is shown in Equation 5.37.
Hw(x) =
∑
i
piP (xi) log (P (xi)) (5.37)
− pi is the priority associated with the variable x being in state i.
− For the search distribution xs, the summation is i = 1 . . . S and pi = pl.
− For each target track distribution xtq, the summation is i = 1 . . .H, where H is the
number of particles making up the track, and pi = pl.
− For each target classification xcq the summation is i = 1 . . .M.
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5.3.3 Hellinger-Bhattacharya Distance
The task based control system uses the Hellinger-Bhattacharya distance between a current
and desired distribution to determine the utility for each task as discussed in Section B.5.
As a result the HB distances are used as a set of metrics for comparison of the different
control schemes. The HB distance δ between two distributions of x is shown in Equation
5.38.
δ
(
P (xa), P (xb)
)
=
[∑
i
(
P (xai )
0.5 − P (xbi)0.5
)2]0.5
(5.38)
Where the current distribution P (xa) is compared to the flat distribution P (xb).
As for the entropy metrics, the HB distance does not capture the relative priority of the
distributions. As a result a measure termed the weighted HB distance δw is used for com-
parison. The weighted entropy is shown in Equation 5.39.
δw =
[∑
i
(
pi
[
P (xai )
0.5 − P (xbi)0.5
])2]0.5
(5.39)
− pi is the priority associated with the variable x being in state i.
− For the search distribution xs, the summation is i = 1 . . . S and pi = pl. For the
uniform distribution P (xs) = |S−1 for a single undetected target as discussed in
Appendix B.
− For each target track distribution xtq, the summation is i = 1 . . .H, where H is the
number of particles making up the track, and pi = pl. For the uniform distribution
P (xt) = H−1.
− For each target classification xcq the summation is i = 1 . . .M. For the uniform distri-
bution P (xc) = Q−1.
5.4 The Simulated System
5.4.1 System Overview
The framework shown in Figure 4.3 was programmed in C++ and implemented for a single
processor as a single threaded application. The application makes use of modular compo-
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nents to allow for flexibility in setup and the testing of interchangeable elements. The code
modules or module blocks closely correspond to the framework components from Chapter
4 as illustrated in Figure 5.4.
Setup Module
Main Simulation
Information Display 
Module
Operator Control 
Module
Tracker 
Module
Classifier 
Module
Search State 
Module
Sensor 
Returner 
Module
Belief State Manager 
Module
Threat Map 
Module
Controller Block
Ground 
Vehicle 
Module
UAV Module
Sensor 
Module
Simulation 
Control 
Module
Main Setup 
Module
UAV Setup 
Module
GV Setup 
Module
Figure 5.4: Software modules used for simulation.
Both the task and value based control schemes make use of the same structure with many
common modules. These common modules and components are described in detail in
Appendix A. The modules which make up the control block in Figure 5.4 unique to task
based control are described in Appendix B.
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5.4.2 Control Modules
For value based control scheme, the control block contains the modules as shown in Figure
5.5.
Value Controller Block
Mission 
Planning Module
Organiser 
Module
Coordination 
Module
UAV Path 
Planner Module
Figure 5.5: Software modules used for information value based control.
The Value Map for each UAV is derived from the Threat Map and operator mission input
as per Section 5.2.3. This map is then used to determine the best path or waypoint using
the control schemes in Section 5.2.4 which is then passed to the UAV Controller.
5.4.3 Simulation Setup and Interface
The Simulation Setup module provides the interface for creating the simulation scenario.
This can be done manually each time the simulation runs or loaded from a file. Once the
scenario is created it is passed to the Main Simulation module which is started by the
operator.
Simulation Setup
The Main Setup module displays the screen shown in Figure 5.6. Using this interface the
number, type and initial locations of UAV sensor platforms and ground vehicles is be set.
Additionally the number, type, orientation and FOV for each sensor carried by the UAV
platforms is established.
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Figure 5.6: Main simulation setup screen.
The setup module also contains two sub modules for setting additional initial conditions for
the UAVs and ground vehicles to be used in simulation. These are discussed below.
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UAV Parameters
The UAV Setup module displays the screen shown in Figure 5.7. This screen provides
a graphical interface for setting initial UAV locations and heading. It also permits an
initial path, consisting of a number of waypoints, to be provided to the UAV controller on
simulation start. If a path is provided, the UAV will complete the path before becoming
available to the system for consideration in the planning loop.
Figure 5.7: Screen for setting up initial UAV parameters.
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Ground Vehicle Parameters
The Ground Vehicle Setup module displays the screen shown in Figure 5.8. This screen
provides a graphical interface for setting initial ground vehicle locations and headings. It
also permits the assignment of any number of waypoints which are provided to the ground
vehicle guidance component, as described in Appendix A.
Figure 5.8: Screen for setting up initial ground vehicle parameters.
5.4.4 Operator Interface
Main Screen
Once the simulation scenario setup is complete the operator is presented with the screen
shown in Figure 5.9. This is the primary information interface between the operator and
the system. All information available to the simulated system, including the belief state
and UAV/Sensor status is available through this screen. The control interface is detailed
in Section 5.4.4
The map display allows a graphical representation of the location of UAVs, the current
footprint as well as a summary of track information for ground vehicles detected and being
tracked. The search state, threat map and value map for each UAV can also be displayed
graphically. For testing purposes the true location of all ground vehicles may be displayed,
however this is normally switched off during a simulation run.
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Figure 5.9: Main screen for displaying information to operator during simulation.
Classification information and detailed UAV/Sensor information is displayed in the dedi-
cated panels.
Mission Parameters
The operator exercises control of the UAV sensor platforms via the Controller or Mission
module which interfaces via the screen shown in Figure 5.10.
Using the graphical control, the operator can instantiate assets and search areas in the
desired location. A priority and vulnerability rating is then assigned along with the threat
function from Section 5.2.2. Existing assets or areas can be modified or removed at any
point during the simulation.
The desired track variance, priority and classification threshold for each vehicle type can
be assigned and dynamically modified using the ground vehicle pane. The classification
threshold indicates the point at which there is no further value in obtaining vehicle type
information. For the Task based control scheme, once the threshold is reached the ‘classify
vehicle’ task is removed from task list.
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Figure 5.10: Mission screen for operator input to control sensor system.
Once vehicles are being tracked, the relative priority of searching for undetected vehicles
is controlled via the Search pane. The assigned search likelihood indicates the threshold
likelihood for searching an area or point for a previously undetected ground vehicle.
5.5 Summary
This chapter has described the software implementation of the the architecture developed
in Chapter 4 using information value as described in Chapter 3. Graphical interfaces are
available to the operator for both visualisation of the information or belief state and for pro-
viding information and control inputs. These are used for the simulation results presented
in Chapter 6.
Chapter 6
Simulation
6.1 Simulation Overview
The main execution loop used by the simulation represents 0.5 seconds of elapsed time. As
the simulation is single thread and run on a single CPU, the relationship between simulation
time and real time is heavily dependant on the number of vehicles being tracked and the
complexity of the sensor platform control scheme being used. In general, using standard
desktop PC hardware, more than 3 or 4 vehicles in track results in each simulation loop
taking more than 0.5 seconds.
During a simulation loop every ground vehicle, UAV and sensor position is recalculated,
sensor observations made and the belief state updated. As the UAV module is setup to run
at 20Hz, the Guidance/Autopilot/Motion Model loop is run 10 times each loop prior to the
sensor observations being triggered.
The planning horizon used is 5 simulation seconds. For the FHF, FHP and IHP control
schemes, the UAV waypoints/paths are updated each replan cycle. For the Task based
control scheme, tasks are reorganised and reallocated each replan cycle. All data, including
the true state of the simulated world and the evaluation metrics, is logged every 5 simulation
seconds.
Each scenario and situation outlined in Section 6.2 was run 5 times for a simulated mission
time of 800 seconds.
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6.2 Scenario Setup
Two example scenarios are used, both based around information gathering in aid of asset
protection. The fixed assets are shown in Table 6.1, along with a vulnerability rating. For
the purposes of these scenarios it is assumed that vulnerability is constant throughout the
simulation. The asset locations are shown in Figure 6.1.
Table 6.1: Assets
Asset Classification Vulnerability
1 Government House Hardened
2 State Library Reinforced
3 Hospital Reinforced
4 Army Barracks Protected
5 Museum Soft
6 Town Hall Reinforced
7 Ferry Terminal Reinforced
8 Central Post Office Reinforced
9 Maritime Museum Reinforced
10 Convention Centre Reinforced
11 Exhibition Centre Reinforced
12 World Trade Centre Hardened
13 Ferry Terminal Reinforced
14 Stadium Reinforced
15 Central Station Reinforced
16 Broadcast Centre Reinforced
17 Ambulance HQ Reinforced
18 Police HQ Hardened
19 Hospital Reinforced
20 Cargo Terminal Reinforced
21 School Soft
22 School Soft
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Figure 6.1: Asset location in the Sydney CBD for the security scenario under investigation
For Task based control, a representative area around each asset is identified for the ‘Search
Area’ task discussed in Appendix B. These areas are shown in Figure 6.2, with the size
of the area corresponding to the vulnerability of the associated asset. Note that the more
vulnerable the asset the larger the search area.
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Figure 6.2: Areas corresponding to asset location in the Sydney CBD for the security
scenario under investigation
6.2.1 Scenario 1
The first scenario consists of 2 UAV sensor platforms and 5 ground vehicles as outlined in
Tables 6.2 and 6.3. Details on the vehicle types can be found in Appendix C.
Table 6.2: Ground Vehicles - Scenario 1
Vehicle Type
1 4wd, Red Force
2 Truck, Light, Blue Force
3 4wd, Civilian
4 Truck, Light, Civilian
5 Car, Civilian
The initial UAV and ground vehicle locations and heading are shown in Figure 6.3. Note
that ground vehicles are indicated by a yellow marker with a coloured border and UAVs
by a red marker with coloured border. The coloured line extending from the UAV marker
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Table 6.3: UAVs - Scenario 1
UAV Type Altitude (m) Sensor Orientation
1 Fast Delta 100 CCD Forward
2 Aerosonde 150 IR Down
indicates the current heading with the current sensor footprint bounded by the same colour
as the marker border.
Figure 6.3: Ground Vehicle and UAV initial locations for Scenario 1.
6.2.2 Scenario 2
The second scenario consists of 3 UAV sensor platforms and 10 ground vehicles as outlined
in Tables 6.4 and 6.5.
The initial UAV and ground vehicle locations and heading are shown in Figure 6.4. Note
that the same symbology applies as for Scenario 1.
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Table 6.4: Ground Vehicles - Scenario 2
Vehicle Type
1 4wd, Militia
2 Truck, Light, Red Force
3 Armour, Light, Blue Force
4 4wd, Blue Force
5 Car, Civilian
6 Car, Civilian
7 Truck, Heavy Civilian
8 Truck, Light, Civilian
9 Truck, Light, Civilian
10 4wd, Civilian
Table 6.5: UAVs - Scenario 2
UAV Type Altitude (m) Sensor Orientation
1 Fast Delta 100 BW CCD Down
2 Aerosonde 175 CCD Down
3 Aerosonde 150 CCD Forward
Figure 6.4: Ground Vehicle and UAV initial locations for Scenario 2.
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6.3 Situation Setup
Using the Scenarios described in Section 6.2, a number of Situations are developed to
examine the impact of: applying the information value scheme presented in Section 5.2,
allowing human directed modification of the value scheme and incorporating information
from external sources. These are outlined below.
6.3.1 Situation 1 - Baseline
For the ‘Baseline’ situation, there is no ranking of asset value or preference order for tracking
the vehicles detected. Thus the utility function for UAV control maximises information gain
with respect to time, without consideration of the information type or value with respect
to a larger mission.
6.3.2 Situation 2 - Operator Modified
In the ‘Operator Modified’ situation, the operator specifies mission parameters prior to the
mission start via the Mission Console as described in Section 5.4.4. The priority for each
asset is set by the appropriate descriptor from Equation 5.2 chosen by the operator. Table
6.1 is reproduced in Table 6.6 with priorities assigned.
The priorities assigned to each asset are an interpretation of the disruption likely to be
caused to the functioning of the city if the asset were targeted for attack.
The system develops a threat map according to the equations in Section 5.2.2 for each
vehicle type using the vulnerability and priority assignment in Table 6.6. A representative
threat map is shown in 6.5.
The preference ordering for tracking and classifying vehicles is determined through the
operator assigned priority, desired track variance and classification threshold. The operator
assigned parameters are shown in Table 6.7.
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Table 6.6: Assets
Asset Classification Priority Vulnerability
1 Government House Highly Valuable Hardened
2 State Library Useful Reinforced
3 Hospital Highly Valuable Reinforced
4 Army Barracks Highly Valuable Protected
5 Museum Important Soft
6 Town Hall Important Reinforced
7 Ferry Terminal Important Reinforced
8 Central Post Office Important Reinforced
9 Maritime Museum Useful Reinforced
10 Convention Centre Valuable Reinforced
11 Exhibition Centre Important Reinforced
12 World Trade Centre Valuable Hardened
13 Ferry Terminal Valuable Reinforced
14 Stadium Useful Reinforced
15 Central Station Valuable Reinforced
16 Broadcast Centre Useful Reinforced
17 Ambulance HQ Highly Valuable Reinforced
18 Police HQ Highly Valuable Hardened
19 Hospital Highly Valuable Reinforced
20 Cargo Terminal Important Reinforced
21 School Useful Soft
22 School Useful Soft
Max
Figure 6.5: Figure on the left shows the relative threat corresponding to the assets outlined
in Table 6.1, with the z axis representing the maximum threat from a target located at that
point. The x,y scale is in metres, and the map grid is shown in the figure on the right.
The priority ranking of vehicle types largely reflects their ability to cause damage to the
assets being protected, with the necessity of knowing where a vehicle is in order to intercept,
being reflected in the desired track variances. The application of the classification threshold
shown recognises the importance of distinguishing between civilians and irregular or insur-
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Table 6.7: Mission Setup
Vehicle Desired Variance Classification
Threshold
Priority
Civilian Light Truck 35 0.98 Desirable
Blue Force Light Truck 45 0.8 Some Impact
Red Force Light Truck 25 0.95 Highly Desirable
Civilian Medium Truck 35 0.98 Desirable
Blue Force Medium Truck 45 0.8 Some Impact
Red Force Medium Truck 25 0.95 Highly Desirable
Civilian Heavy Truck 35 0.98 Desirable
Blue Force Heavy Truck 60 0.8 Some Impact
Red Force Heavy Truck 10 0.95 Highly Desirable
Civilian 4WD 35 0.98 Some Impact
Blue Force 4WD 60 0.8 Some Impact
Red Force 4WD 10 0.95 Highly Desirable
Militia 4WD 10 0.98 Mission Critical
Civilian Motorbike 35 0.98 Desirable
Militia Motorbike 10 0.98 Mission Critical
Civilian Car 35 0.98 Desirable
Blue Force Car 45 0.8 Some Impact
Red Force Car 25 0.95 Highly Desirable
Militia Car 10 0.98 Mission Critical
Blue Force Light Armour 90 0.8 Some Impact
Red Force Light Armour 10 0.95 Mission Critical
Blue Force Heavy Armour 90 0.8 Some Impact
Blue Force IFV 90 0.8 Some Impact
Search Likelihood Threshold 0.25 Mission Critical
gent forces prior to intercepting or using force. Thus via the Mission Console much high
level reasoning regarding the overall situation is captured from the operator prior to the
mission starting, which is then used as part of the utility function for determining allocation
of sensor resources.
6.3.3 Situation 3 - Online Operator Modified
In the ‘Online Operator Modified’ situation the operator modifies mission parameters during
the mission. This may be done to reflect new mission priorities or other changes in situation
that may be external to the system.
The initial mission parameters are identical to Situation 2, with the changes described in
Table 6.8.
The modification to the priority assigned to Asset 14, Stadium and Asset 15, Central
Station, reflects a situation where the mission priority of an asset or area may change due
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Table 6.8: Operator modified mission parameters
Time (s) Mission Element Mission Parameter Original Modified
250 Stadium Priority Useful Highly Valuable
250 Central Station Priority Valuable Highly Valuable
450 Civilian Light Truck Priority Desirable Highly Desirable
450 Civilian Light Truck Desired Variance 35 20
450 Civilian 4wd Priority Desirable Highly Desirable
450 Civilian 4wd Desired Variance 35 20
450 Civilian Motorbike Priority Desirable Highly Desirable
450 Civilian Motorbike Desired Variance 35 20
450 Civilian Car Priority Desirable Highly Desirable
450 Civilian Car Desired Variance 35 20
to external factors. For example in this case it may be due to a large event scheduled at
the given location or specific information or tip off regarding an imminent threat which is
then passed on to the operator. The change in priority and desired variance for all civilian
vehicles in this case may represent a situation where it has been found that distinguishing
between civilian and militia is more difficult than originally expected.
Using this online modification of mission parameters, the operator’s judgement of the sit-
uation, both with respect to the larger external mission and events observed through the
system, can be captured and used to reallocate sensor resources in response to the current
situation.
The ‘Online Operator Modified’ situation was run only with Scenario 2.
6.3.4 Situation 4 - Observation Points
In the ‘Observation Points’ situation, observers are located around a number of key instal-
lations. These observers can relay information back to the system, with the information
provided able to be incorporated into the system’s belief state. The initial mission param-
eters are identical to Situation 2, with the areas in the observers’ view shown in Figure
6.6.
The ‘Observation Points’ situation was run only with Scenario 2.
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Figure 6.6: Areas observable from the fixed observation points.
6.3.5 Situation 5 - External Observations
The ‘External Observations’ situation is similar to Situation 4, however there are no fixed
observers. Observations come through as a single report as they might from a tip off or
patrol moving through the area. A summary of the observations is shown in Table 6.9.
Table 6.9: External observations.
Time (s) Observation
120 Vehicle 1
150 Vehicle 6
450 Vehicle 1
500 Vehicle 2
In this case the external information received is considered reliable and used to update the
system’s belief state. The ‘External Observations’ situation was run only with Scenario 2.
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6.4 Simulation Results
The following sections present a snap shot of the data collected from running the scenarios
and situations from Sections 6.2 and 6.3 in simulation. The data for each situation is the
average of five runs. If a target is not detected in at least three of the five runs, the detection,
track and classification information for that target is not shown.
For each simulation set, the time to find and classify each of the simulated ground vehicle
targets is presented as a comparison of different control types, preference ordering and
situations. The threat posed by all simulated ground vehicles, given their location and
type is known at each time step is defined as the true threat. The true threat for each
simulation set is shown graphically along with the system’s estimate of the true threat.
The absolute difference at each time step between the true and estimated threat is also
presented graphically along with the cumulative error in the system’s threat estimate.
The results presented are logged at the end of each 5 second planning cycle. Thus new target
detections and classifications between planning cycles only appear in the simulation data
logs at the end of each cycle. The operator, however sees the new detection or classification
as soon as it is fused into the system belief state.
6.4.1 Baseline vs Operator Modified
In this section the simulation is run with no preference ordering, which is referred to as
the Baseline, and is compared to the results of adding preference ordering, referred to
as Operator Modified. In the Operator Modified scenario the asset and ground vehicle
preference data from Tables 6.6 and 6.7 is input prior to the mission start. This is then
used to determine the value of information as per Chapter 5. Both Scenario 1 and 2 are
examined for each of the four control schemes.
Scenario 1
Examining Table 6.10 it can seen that the two control schemes which have limited waypoint
planning, FHP and FHF, show identical detection times for the Baseline and Operator
Modified simulations. It appears that by only considering the local threat, the behaviour of
the sensor platforms is not sufficiently altered by preference ordering to result in additional
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Table 6.10: Targets Tracked - Baseline vs Operator Modified for Scenario 1
FHP
BSL
FHP
OPM
FHF
BSL
FHF
OPM
IHP
BSL
IHP
OPM
Task
BSL
Task
OPM
Targets Found 3 3 5 5 1 4 5 4
Time to Find (s)
1 - - 185.5 185.5 - 75.5 80.5 -
2 15.5 15.5 140.5 140.5 - 200.5 10.5 260.5
3 - - 100.5 100.5 - - 105.5 190.5
4 280.5 280.5 15.5 15.5 10.5 10.5 420.5 10.5
5 10.5 10.5 35.5 35.5 - 115.5 10.5 110.5
Targets Classified 1 1 3 5 1 4 4 1
Time to Classify (s)
1 - - - 755.5 - 100.5 160.5 -
2 - - 310.5 310.5 - 230.5 20.5 265.5
3 - - 470.5 495.5 - - 625.5 -
4 365.5 365.5 - 675.5 70.5 170.5 445.5 -
5 - - 490.5 500.5 - 290.5 - -
target detections. As preference ordering primarily effects the threat map on a larger scale,
the difference in utility between observing 2 nearby nodes will be similar with or without
preference ordering. In general preference ordering will only cause a significant difference
in detection performance with FHP and FHF when the ordering results in 2 assets close
together having very different values or when a target track of high or low value is within
the area being considered.
The number of targets detected with the IHP control scheme increased from 1 to 4 using
preference ordering, and most significantly resulted in the detection of Target 1 which is the
Red Force threat. Unlike FHP and FHF control schemes, IHP considers the entire threat
map when determining a new waypoint and thus, changes due to preference ordering have a
greater impact. Using Task based control resulted fewer detections with preference ordering
and importantly, Target 1 was not detected.
Of the four control schemes only FHF control detected Target 1 with or without preference
ordering. Without preference ordering Target 1 was not classified, however with ordering
it was classified at 755.5 seconds. Of note is that while target detection times for FHF did
not change, all targets were classified.
Examining the FHP and FHF graphs in Figure 6.7 it can be seen that changes to the
true and estimated threat plots through the addition of preference ordering were relatively
small. Much more significant changes can be seen for IHP and Task based controls. The
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IHP graph shows consistently better threat estimates using preference ordering while the
Task graph shows marginally better performance for the Baseline estimate. This is better
illustrated in Figure 6.8.
In Figure in 6.8 as in Figure 6.7 the difference between the estimated threat, with or without
preference ordering, with FHP control is very small. As a result the cumulative error plots
are similar with a small improvement seen when applying preference ordering. FHF shows
a similar trend however the performance improvement is significantly larger. As is alluded
to by Table 6.10 and Figure 6.7, applying preference ordering to IHP control significantly
improves the threat estimate. Conversely for Task based control, the average error is greater
when using preference ordering. Looking at the Task graph the oscillating behaviour of the
threat estimate can be seen with the threat estimate error up to twice the peak error of
IHP, particularly when using preference ordering.
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Figure 6.7: True and Estimated Threat for Scenario 1 for each control scheme.
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Figure 6.8: The threat estimate error and cumulative average error for each control scheme
in Scenario 1.
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The Track Entropy graph in figure 6.9 shows the same track behaviour in both the pref-
erence and non-preference ordered scenarios. This indicates that the small improvements
in performance due to ordering are the result of reductions in the search state entropy.
As neither IHP or Task controllers detected Target 1 in both preferenced an preferenced
cases, these graphs provide little to inform the change of performance with respect to threat
estimation, however from the entropy of the targets detected it can be seen that preference
ordering does have a significant effect on the observations taken.
The effect of preference ordering is most clearly seen in the FHF graph with the entropy
of the Target 1 track distribution. The relatively constant track entropy between 400 and
750s indicates constant observation of track particles without actually observing the target
itself. The Baseline plot shows 2 addition observations of Target 1 at approximately 450s
and 660s, however by the subsequent peaks it can be seen that the system has not allocated
resources to maintain a good track estimate, despite potentially being a high threat target.
Conversely the preference ordered plot indicates resources being allocated to tracking Target
1 while allowing the entropy to increase on other less threatening tracks, most clearly seen
in the plot of Target 3.
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Figure 6.9: Track entropy for each each control scheme in Scenario 1. Baseline left and
Operator modified right.
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Scenario 2
The target detection times for FHP and FHF 6.11 with and without preference ordering
in Scenario 2, closely mirror Scenario 1. As in Scenario 1, preference ordering when using
the Task based controller resulted in fewer detected targets and those detected often being
detected later. The most significant change in behaviour from Scenario 1 to 2 is in the IHP
sets. In Scenario 2 detection times are very similar in the Baseline and Operator Modified
simulations with only a small change for Targets 3 and 5.
Table 6.11: Targets Tracked - Baseline vs Operator Modified for Scenario 2
FHP
BSL
FHP
OPM
FHF
BSL
FHF
OPM
IHP
BSL
IHP
OPM
Task
BSL
Task
OPM
Targets Found 6 6 10 10 10 10 10 9
Time to Find (s)
1 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 95.5
2 - - 10.5 10.5 5.5 5.5 30.5 65.5
3 30.5 30.5 100.5 100.5 180.5 240.5 50.5 -
4 - - 45.5 45.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 10.5
5 130.5 130.5 380.5 375.5 115.5 250.5 5.5 115.5
6 5.5 5.5 35.5 35.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 25.5
7 240.5 240.5 15.5 15.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 15.5
8 - - 10.5 10.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 25.5
9 - - 350.5 230.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 40.5
10 135.5 135.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 5.5 15.5
Targets Classified 2 2 9 10 10 10 10 8
Time to Classify (s)
1 - - 120.5 120.5 500.5 115.5 210.5 255.5
2 - - 350.5 490.5 130.5 125.5 75.5 80.5
3 55.5 55.5 780.5 580.5 250.5 295.5 350.5 -
4 - - 195.5 220.5 440.5 80.5 55.5 75.5
5 - - - 720.5 380.5 605.5 525.5 -
6 - - 115.5 120.5 285.5 660.5 315.5 310.5
7 445.5 445.5 45.5 45.5 80.5 210.5 200.5 80.5
8 - - 130.5 130.5 135.5 85.5 45.5 400.5
9 - - 450.5 535.5 105.5 110.5 75.5 125.5
10 - - 120.5 120.5 460.5 195.5 80.5 80.5
As for Scenario 1 the threat estimate plots for FHP, shown in Figure 6.10, with and without
preference ordering are similar. Unlike Scenario 1, the FHF threat estimate with preference
ordering is considerably closer to the true threat for most of the simulation. For the IHP
controller, the clear performance improvement with respect to threat estimate observed in
Scenario 1 is not present in Scenario 2.
As for Scenario 1, for FHP, FHF and IHP controllers there is an improvement in threat
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estimation performance with preference ordering, while the Task controller exhibits worse
performance with ordering.
The Track Entropy graphs in figure 6.12 for FHP show the same behaviour for Scenario
2 as Scenario 1 and thus the conclusions regarding the performance improvements due to
search entropy also apply. For the FHF and IHP controllers, there is no evidence of any
performance improvement due to preference ordering and the resulting track of the Red
Force ground vehicle, Target 1. For the Task based controller however, the Baseline does
not display the high track entropy plateau from 500 to 800s seen in the Operator Modified
scenario.
Baseline vs Operator Modified Summary
From the results of Scenarios 1 and 2, FHP, FHF and IHP control schemes showed improved
estimation of true threat with the use of preference ordering to assign value to assets and
targets. For these 3 control schemes the overall target detection rate, detection times,
classification rate and classification times either stayed the same or showed improvement.
By the same performance measures, the application of preference ordering for the Task
based control scheme showed poorer performance.
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Figure 6.10: True and Estimated Threat for Scenario 2 for each control scheme.
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Figure 6.11: The difference between True and Estimated Threat for Scenario 2 with Baseline
left and Operator modified right.
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Figure 6.12: Track entropy for each each control scheme in Scenario 2. Baseline left and
Operator modified right.
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6.4.2 Control Type Comparison
The Operator Modified system used in Section 6.4.1 is examined here in more detail to
compare the different control types and to highlight some behaviours of the system resulting
from utilising information value to make control decision.
Figures 6.13 and 6.14 show the entropy of each state observed by the system for each control
scheme in Scenarios 1 and 2 respectively. As one of the states observed the target track
entropy graphs presented in Section 6.4.1 are contained within these graphs.
From Figures 6.13 and 6.14 it can be seen that the search entropy remains largely constant.
This is due to the area of the map continuously observed by the sensor platforms being
small and relatively constant compared to the total search area. A more detail comparison
of the search component of the observed states for each control scheme is shown in Figures
6.21 and 6.22.
Target observations can be clearly seen as steps in the classification entropy plots and
troughs in the track entropy plots. Troughs in the track entropy plots that do not have a
corresponding step in classification indicate observation of track particles without observa-
tion of the target. An example of this discussed in Section 6.4.1 can be seen in the FHF
graph. No observations of Target 1 are made during the period 200 to 700s, however the
track entropy is maintained through observation of the track.
The entropy limit can be seen for both the search and target track states. For the track
entropy plots this limit is the point at which there is equal probability on each track particle
and each particle is centred on a different node. This is seen in both FHP graphs. Where
this entropy limit is reached, the particle filter tracker is likely to become ‘starved’ unless
an observation is made quickly. In the starved state, the filter does not have enough
particles to represent the true state of the target track and subsequent observations cannot
be associated to the track without additional classification information. With a dense road
network, particle starvation of implemented tracker can occur quickly. Starvation can be
observed in the Scenario 1 FHP track plot for Vehicles 2 and 5 and in the Scenario 2 FHP
track plot for Vehicle 6. Other tracks approach starvation, but in each case an observation
is made before this occurs.
Step increases in track entropy can be caused both by characteristics of the map network
and characteristics of the particle filter tracker. Each road junction will cause a step change
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in track entropy and a large number of intersections will very rapidly decay the track
estimate. However these steps are likely to be small. A null target observation of the track
can also result in increased entropy in the track distribution if the null observation of the
target is associated with a number of particles which have a high probability prior. The
redistribution of these particles and their associated probability across the track distribution
can cause a step increase in track entropy.
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Figure 6.13: Entropy of each belief state observed for Scenario 1.
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Figure 6.14: Entropy of the belief states for Scenario 2.
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The track Hellinger-Bhattacharya distance in Figures 6.15 and 6.18 is a measure of the
distance of the current track estimate from a naive or flat distribution. When a vehicle is
detected particles are redistributed by the tracker such that they cluster around the point
on the map associated with detection. Fusing a target observation results in minimum
track distribution entropy and maximum Hellinger-Bhattacharya distance from the naive
distribution. These observations can be seen as steps in the plot and correspond with the
points of minimum entropy in Figures 6.13 and 6.14. The Hellinger-Bhattacharya distance
graphs mirror the associated entropy graphs, however the decay in the target position
estimate as the target ground vehicle moves around the road network can be seen more
clearly.
It is the weighted Hellinger-Bhattacharya distance shown in Figures 6.17 and 6.20 that is
used by all control schemes as the basis for assigning information value. This weighted
distance considers the track distribution with respect to the assets being protected, the
target classification and the classification entropy. The later shown in Figures 6.16 and
6.19.
An example of the insight into the system behaviour provided by the weighted Hellinger-
Bhattacharya distance is the plot for Target 1 with FHF control during Scenario 2. In
Figure 6.14 the track entropy for Target 1 shows an oscillating tendency with peaks and
troughs at similar values. This is reflected in the track Hellinger-Bhattacharya distance in
Figure 6.18. However in the weighted Hellinger-Bhattacharya plot in Figure 6.20 there are
3 distinct segments for the Target 1 peak, from 0 to 150s, 150 to 650s and 650 to 800s. At
approximately 150s it can be seen from Figure 6.19 that Target 1 is classified, and being a
Red Force vehicle means that the value for observing the Target 1 track will increase. This
is reflected in the higher peaks in the weighted Hellinger-Bhattacharya distance after this
time. The better track estimate resulting from a number of track observations from 650s, as
seen in Figure 6.14, combined with the Target beginning to move away from a high priority
asset results in reduced peaks in the weighted Hellinger-Bhattacharya plot.
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Figure 6.15: The track Hellinger-Bhattacharya distance for Scenario 1 for each control
scheme.
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Figure 6.16: Classification probability conditioned on true type for targets detected using
each control scheme for Scenario 1.
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Figure 6.17: Weighted Hellinger-Bhattacharya distance for Scenario 1 for each control
scheme.
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Figure 6.18: The track Hellinger-Bhattacharya distance for Scenario 2 for each control
scheme.
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Figure 6.19: Classification probability conditioned on true type for targets detected using
each control scheme for Scenario 2.
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Figure 6.20: Weighted Hellinger-Bhattacharya distance for Scenario 2 for each control
scheme.
6.4 Simulation Results 86
500
600
700
B
h a
t t a
c
h a
r y
a
 
D
i s
t a
n
c
e
Search Hellinger-Bhattacharya Distance: Scenario 1
FHP - Weighted HB Dist.
FHF - Weighted HB Dist.
0
100
200
300
400
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
H
e
l l i
n
g e
r -
B
h a
t t a
c
h a
r y
a
 
D
i s
t a
n
c
e
Time
IHP - Weighted HB Dist.
TASK - Weighted HB Dist.
FHP - Weighted HB Av.
FHF - Weighted HB Av.
IHP - Weighted HB Av.
TASK - Weighted HB Av.
Figure 6.21: Weighted Hellinger-Bhattacharya distance for the search distribution for each
control scheme in Scenario 1.
Figures 6.21 and 6.22 show the weighted Hellinger-Bhattacharya distance of the search
distribution from the naive or flat distribution along with the cumulative average. Lower
values indicate less probability of undetected targets around valuable assets and/or a more
compact search distribution in these areas. For Scenario 1, there is a clear performance
ranking between the different control schemes:
− FHP
− Task
− IHP
− FHF
For Scenario 2 the difference in performance between FHF, IHP and Task is minimal,
however FHP shows significantly better performance.
From the detection/classification Tables 6.10 and 6.11 for Scenario 1 using the Operator
Modified preference ordering the performance ranking for the control types is:
6.4 Simulation Results 87
1000
1200
1400
1600
B
h a
t t a
c h
a r
y a
 
D
i s
t a
n
c e
Search Hellinger-Bhattacharya Distance: Scenario 2
FHP - Weighted HB Dist.
FHF - Weighted HB Dist.
IHP - Weighted HB Dist.
0
200
400
600
800
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
H
e l
l i n
g e
r -
B
h a
t t a
c h
a r
y a
 
D
i s
t a
n
c e
Time
TASK - Weighted HB 
Dist.
FHP - Weighted HB Av.
FHF - Weighted HB Av.
IHP - Weighted HB Av.
TASK - Weighted HB Av.
PD
F Created with deskPDF PDF W
riter - Trial :: http://www.docudesk.com
Figure 6.22: Weighted Hellinger-Bhattacharya distance for the search distribution for each
control scheme in Scenario 2.
− FHF with 5 detections, 5 classifications
− IHP with 4 detections, 4 classifications
− Task with 4 detections, 1 classification
− FHP with 3 detections, 1 classification
For Scenario 2 the performance ranking is:
− IHP with 10 detections, 10 classifications
− FHF with 10 detections, 10 classifications
− Task with 9 detections, 8 classifications
− FHP with 6 detections, 2 classification
Note that for both scenarios, the detection and classification performance of the Task based
controller with no preference ordering is similar to the top ranked control schemes.
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Considering the cumulative average threat error in Figure 6.8, the performance ranking for
Scenario 1 is:
− FHF
− FHP
− IHP
− Task
From Figure 6.11 the ranking for Scenario 2 is:
− FHF
− Task
− IHP
− FHP
Note that using Task based control with no preference ordering, the cumulative average
threat error is below all other control schemes using preference ordering. However the
speed at which the average threat error drops to the lower value is slower, this indicates
that the other control schemes provide a better threat estimate during the initial states of
simulation.
In Figure 6.20 the weighted Hellinger-Bhattacharya plots for Target 1 have consistently low
peaks for FHF and IHP control. This indicates that these control systems are providing
good track information on Target 1, particularly when the track propagates into areas where
Target 1 may pose a threat to assets. While there is a very large peak at around 700s in
the IHP plot, a number of observations are made relatively quickly bringing it back down.
This is in contrast to the FHP plot which remains consistently high and the system does
not bring the value back down. The Task based controller shows characteristics present
in both FHF and FHP plots at different time. Up to approximately 300s a low weighted
Hellinger-Bhattacharya distance for Target 1 is maintained, while after 500s this value
increases significantly and the system does not react as aggressively as with IHP control to
bring it back down.
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Control Type Comparison Summary
Despite using the same preference ordering, the relative performance of the different control
schemes implemented varies significantly with the best performing depending on the metric
of performance used. Discounting the performance of the Task based controller without
preference ordering, the FHF and IHP control schemes are the best performers with respect
to detecting, classifying and tracking targets. The FHP control in general performs worst
with respect to these metrics, with the Task based controller performing somewhere in the
middle. However with respect to search performance, the FHP controller shows a significant
performance advantage over the other control types.
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6.4.3 Mission: Online Operator Modified
In the Online Operator Modified scenario, mission parameters are modified during the
simulation as described by Table 6.8. Detection and classification times along with the
threat estimate are used for comparison with the Operator Modified scenario in which the
preference ordering is static.
In Figure 6.23 a small step increase in threat can be seen at 250s, which corresponds to
the operator upgrading the value of Assets 14 and 15 to ‘Highly Valuable’. This change
results in both undetected and tracked ground vehicles in the vicinity of these assets being
considered a higher threat and thus there is an increase in the overall true threat. A second
larger step is seen at 450s. This corresponds to the operator receiving information that
the Red Force is commandeering civilian vehicles and as a result upgrades the priority
for detecting and tracking civilian ground vehicles. As there are 6 civilian vehicles in the
simulation, this change results in a large increase in the true threat. As can be seen in
Table 6.12, all control schemes have a number of civilian vehicles being tracked, thus the
estimated threat also increases when this priority is changed. Note that for FHP control
only 3 civilian vehicles are in track at 450s and thus the estimated threat does not increase
to the same extent as the true threat. For all cases it can be seen that the operator’s actions
have approximately doubled the true threat.
In Figure 6.24 both the threat error and cumulative threat error plots can be seen to diverge
at 250s, which corresponds to the first online modification of the mission. In all 4 control
cases the average threat estimation error is significantly reduced compared to the unmodified
scenario.
Despite the significantly better performance with respect to threat estimation, the detection
and classification times for all control schemes is little changed. In Table 6.12 only FHF
reduces in classification performance with one less civilian target classified while FHF and
IHP take longer to detect civilian Targets 4 and 5 with online modification of the mission.
6.4.4 Online Operator Modified Summary
The threat estimate plots show that the online changes to the mission have an immediate
effect on the system’s threat estimate and in some cases the change in the threat estimate
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Table 6.12: Targets Tracked - Online Operator Modified Scenario 2
FHP
BSL
FHP
OOPM
FHF
BSL
FHF
OOPM
IHP
BSL
IHP
OOPM
Task
BSL
Task
OOPM
Targets Found 6 6 10 10 10 10 10 10
Time to Find (s)
1 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 25.5
2 - - 10.5 10.5 5.5 5.5 30.5 70.5
3 30.5 30.5 100.5 100.5 180.5 250.5 50.5 40.5
4 - - 45.5 45.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 10.5
5 130.5 130.5 380.5 340.5 115.5 250.5 5.5 570.5
6 5.5 5.5 35.5 35.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 85.5
7 240.5 240.5 15.5 15.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 15.5
8 - - 10.5 10.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 65.5
9 - - 350.5 175.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 40.5
10 135.5 135.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 5.5 15.5
Targets Classified 2 1 9 8 10 10 10 7
Time to Classify (s)
1 - - 120.5 120.5 500.5 360.5 210.5 -
2 - - 350.5 285.5 130.5 125.5 75.5 275.5
3 55.5 55.5 780.5 - 250.5 295.5 350.5 -
4 - - 195.5 270.5 440.5 80.5 55.5 60.5
5 - - - - 380.5 645.5 525.5 -
6 - - 115.5 120.5 285.5 720.5 315.5 360.5
7 445.5 - 45.5 45.5 80.5 210.5 200.5 65.5
8 - - 130.5 130.5 135.5 85.5 45.5 200.5
9 - - 450.5 365.5 105.5 110.5 75.5 220.5
10 - - 120.5 120.5 460.5 195.5 80.5 65.5
will depend on the system’s current belief state. The threat error plots show the changes
quickly becoming part of the decision making process for all control schemes and by updating
the mission with external information, provide a significantly better estimate of the true
threat.
6.4 Simulation Results 92
Th
re
at
 P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
:F
in
ite
 H
or
iz
on
 P
ea
k
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
70
0
80
0
Ti
m
e
Threat Error
S
ta
tic
 P
re
fe
re
nc
e
S
ta
tic
 P
re
fe
re
nc
e 
E
st
im
at
ed
TR
U
E
O
nl
in
e 
M
od
. E
st
im
at
ed
Th
re
at
 P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
:F
in
ite
 H
or
iz
on
 F
oo
tp
rin
t
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
70
0
80
0
Ti
m
e
Threat Error
S
ta
tic
 P
re
fe
re
nc
e
S
ta
tic
 P
re
fe
re
nc
e 
E
st
im
at
ed
TR
U
E
O
nl
in
e 
M
od
. E
st
im
at
ed
Th
re
at
 P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
:In
fin
ite
 H
or
iz
on
 P
ea
k
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
70
0
80
0
Ti
m
e
Threat Error
S
ta
tic
 P
re
fe
re
nc
e
S
ta
tic
 P
re
fe
re
nc
e 
E
st
im
at
ed
TR
U
E
O
nl
in
e 
M
od
. E
st
im
at
ed
Th
re
at
 P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
:T
as
k
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
70
0
80
0
Ti
m
e
Threat Error
S
ta
tic
 P
re
fe
re
nc
e
S
ta
tic
 P
re
fe
re
nc
e 
E
st
im
at
ed
TR
U
E
O
nl
in
e 
M
od
. E
st
im
at
ed
Figure 6.23: True and Estimated Threat for the Online Operator Modified situation.
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Figure 6.24: The threat estimate error and cumulative average error for each control scheme.
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6.4.5 Mission: Observation Points
In the observation points scenario a portion of the map is continuously observed, either
through surveillance cameras or an Observation Post (OP). The system treats this as an-
other sensor in the network and updates the belief accordingly. The location and area
covered by these additional sensors is shown in Figure 6.6.
The scale and shape of the system estimated threat graphs shown in Figure 6.25 indicate
that the additional sensors have little effect on the overall threat estimate. The reason for
this is the small area of the map covered by the additional sensors, and as static OPs, only
observations of targets and tracks passing through the field of view are made.
The cumulative threat error plots shown in Figure 6.26 show the addition of static sensors
results in only a small change in threat estimation performance. However this change in
performance is for the worse with the IHP controller and for the FHF controller in the later
stages of the simulation.
Table 6.13: Targets Tracked - Observation Points Scenario 2
FHP
BSL
FHP
OBPS
FHF
BSL
FHF
OBPS
IHP
BSL
IHP
OBPS
Task
BSL
Task
OBPS
Targets Found 6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Time to Find (s)
1 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 5.5 55.5 5.5 20.5
2 - 10.5 10.5 10.5 5.5 10.5 30.5 10.5
3 30.5 30.5 100.5 250.5 180.5 295.5 50.5 10.5
4 - 450.5 45.5 90.5 5.5 80.5 5.5 45.5
5 130.5 80.5 380.5 40.5 115.5 285.5 5.5 30.5
6 5.5 5.5 35.5 35.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 40.5
7 240.5 445.5 15.5 15.5 10.5 20.5 10.5 20.5
8 - 480.5 10.5 10.5 5.5 65.5 5.5 190.5
9 - 715.5 350.5 35.5 5.5 45.5 5.5 30.5
10 135.5 65.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 65.5 5.5 165.5
Targets Classified 2 7 9 10 10 9 10 10
Time to Classify (s)
1 - - 120.5 130.5 500.5 210.5 210.5 190.5
2 - 15.5 350.5 15.5 130.5 15.5 75.5 15.5
3 55.5 35.5 780.5 500.5 250.5 390.5 350.5 190.5
4 - 455.5 195.5 130.5 440.5 85.5 55.5 50.5
5 - 125.5 - 215.5 380.5 - 525.5 85.5
6 - 70.5 115.5 85.5 285.5 125.5 315.5 330.5
7 445.5 - 45.5 85.5 80.5 65.5 200.5 205.5
8 - 485.5 130.5 225.5 135.5 80.5 45.5 225.5
9 - 720.5 450.5 130.5 105.5 130.5 75.5 75.5
10 - - 120.5 185.5 460.5 225.5 80.5 185.5
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The changes in decision making due to the addition of the static sensors is more clearly
seen in the detection/ classification times shown in Table 6.13. In the case of IHP, Target 2
is detected at 5.5s due to directing a UAV to observe a high threat area. With the addition
off an OP in the vicinity there is reduced utility in assigning a UAV to observe the area and
thus this target is not detected by a UAV. The table shows that Target 2 is first detected by
an OP at 10.5s and this sensor then classifies the target at 15.5s. As the observation is fused
into the common belief state, subsequent target observation to update the track estimate
are performed by UAV observation. The addition of static sensors is also responsible for
the additional detections seen in the FHP results. Targets 4, 8 and 9 are first detected by a
static sensor and these observations are also responsible for enabling classification of Target
4,5,6,8 and 9. Despite the additional tracks and classifications with FHP, from Figure 6.26
the overall estimate is poorer. This is as a result of the additional targets being civilian
vehicles which pose a comparatively small threat to assets.
6.4.6 Observation Points Summary
In the scenario presented, the addition of observation points or static sensors did not have
a large impact on the system’s performance with respect to threat estimation. The main
change in the system’s performance will be seen in the search belief state, however the impact
will be largely dependant on the ratio of the area covered by the static sensors to the overall
area. The probability of high threat targets passing through the static sensor’s field of view
may also contribute to some extent. As shown by threat estimate error plots, the additional
static sensors do not necessarily result in better threat estimation performance.
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Figure 6.25: True and Estimated Threat for the Observation Points situation.
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Figure 6.26: True and Estimated Threat for the Observation Points situation for each
control scheme.
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6.4.7 Mission: External Observations
In the External Observations scenario a number of target observations are provided to the
system from an external source as outlined in Table 6.9. The observations take the form
of vehicle type and location at a given time and are fused into the belief state in the same
update cycle as UAV observations.
As in the Observation Points Scenario in Section 6.4.5, it can be seen from Figure 6.27 that
changes in the system’s estimated threat due to additional observations is minimal. Two
of the external observations are of targets that contribute little to the overall threat while
the observation of the Red Force vehicle, Target 1, occurs after it is already being tracked
by all control schemes.
The threat error plots in Figure 6.28, show that the threat estimation performance for
all control schemes, except Task, result on poorer performance compared to the Operator
Modified scenario. This result is result is counter intuitive, as the external observations
add information to the system and would be expected to aid threat estimation. With the
addition of information in the Observation Points scenario also causing poorer performance
in 2 cases, this indicates that information addition may result in poorer performance when
the metric used for utility is not solely based on information gain. This is taken up further
in Chapter 7.
As for Observation Points, the four external observations fused into the belief state have
relatively little impact on the difference between the True Threat and Estimated Threat.
All 4 control schemes detect Target 1 prior to the external observation. As a result from
Table 6.14, the most significant change in detection/classification times is in classification
time. The external observation of Target 1 at 120s does however result in target classification
by 125.5s for FHP and IHP.
6.4.8 External Observations Summary
It has been shown that external observations of the correct format can be seamlessly in-
tegrated into the system, with the information adding to the belief state. However it was
shown that these changes to not necessarily result in a performance improvement.
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Table 6.14: Targets Tracked - External Observations Scenario 2
FHP
BSL
FHP
EXTO
FHF
BSL
FHF
EXTO
IHP
BSL
IHP
EXTO
Task
BSL
Task
EXTO
Targets Found 6 8 10 10 10 10 10 10
Time to Find (s)
1 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
2 - 500.5 10.5 10.5 5.5 5.5 30.5 35.5
3 30.5 30.5 100.5 100.5 180.5 320.5 50.5 50.5
4 - 515.5 45.5 45.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
5 130.5 240.5 380.5 385.5 115.5 385.5 5.5 5.5
6 5.5 5.5 35.5 35.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
7 240.5 270.5 15.5 15.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5
8 - - 10.5 10.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
9 - 410.5 350.5 345.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
10 135.5 - 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 5.5 5.5
Targets Classified 2 2 9 9 10 10 10 10
Time to Classify (s)
1 - 125.5 120.5 120.5 500.5 125.5 210.5 100.5
2 - - 350.5 500.5 130.5 125.5 75.5 60.5
3 55.5 55.5 780.5 420.5 250.5 395.5 350.5 100.5
4 - - 195.5 205.5 440.5 80.5 55.5 55.5
5 - 720.5 - - 380.5 485.5 525.5 420.5
6 - - 115.5 120.5 285.5 240.5 315.5 375.5
7 445.5 - 45.5 45.5 80.5 190.5 200.5 180.5
8 - - 130.5 130.5 135.5 85.5 45.5 55.5
9 - - 450.5 675.5 105.5 110.5 75.5 50.5
10 - - 120.5 120.5 460.5 170.5 80.5 130.5
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Figure 6.27: True and Estimated Threat for the External Observations situation.
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Figure 6.28: True and Estimated Threat for the External Observations situation for each
control scheme.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Architecture
A flexible framework for human-robot cooperation has been implemented and demonstrated
in a simulation environment. The basic architecture has been shown to be adaptable, via
module substitution, to a variety of control concepts. Two different control schemes, in
information value and task based control, have been demonstrated using the same basic
architecture.
The implementation of the cooperative architecture has been shown to allow human judge-
ment of the wider mission to be captured and fed into the system. This capturing of human
situational evaluation has been demonstrated both as an a priori input and as an online
dynamic process.
The architecture allows for the use of different sensor types and platforms and and has been
demonstrated with sensor input from sources external to the system.
7.2 Information Value Based Control
A consistent formulation of information value, based on information theoretic concepts
that takes into account wider mission objectives and the current information state, has
been presented. This has been demonstrated as a valid basis for controlling a number of
heterogeneous sensor platforms for an information gathering task.
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It has also been shown that this concept of control can be used to capture some of the
wider situational context and operator knowledge. Further, any changes to the situation
are quickly assimilated into the belief state and the behaviour of the system modified.
7.3 Control Schemes
Four control schemes were demonstrated in simulation, with 3 using the information value
based control discussed in Chapter 3. The fourth scheme utilised an identical valuation
system but used a platform to task allocation method of control.
A number of different metrics were used to evaluate the performance of each control type:
− Overall estimation of the true threat state
− Maintenance of Red Force vehicle tracks
− Detection and Classification times
− Search performance
With respect to these metrics the performance ranking of the control schemes was signif-
icantly different depending on the metric used. FHF and IHP controllers performed best
against the detection and classification metric, Task in threat estimation, Task and FHP
for tracking and FHP for searching.
The Task controller explicitly assigns a ‘track’ tasking to a UAV. As a result, high threat
targets are more likely to be reacquired and observed once in track. In the case of FHP,
the limited area considered in the path planning loop results in a tendency to remain in the
vicinity of a high threat target once detected. This same characteristic is responsible for the
FHP search performance. As a weighted measure, once the UAV is in an area considered to
be vulnerable the control loop will tend to continues searching the local area. However this
becomes a liability when looking at detection/classification performance as the controller is
reluctant to move the UAV to new lower threat areas.
The increased area of the map considered by the FHF controller overcomes the deficien-
cies in the FHP controller for detection and classification. However the weighted search
performance suffers as a result.
7.4 Scenarios 104
It has been shown that small changes to the control scheme can significantly affect the
performance of the system and that the resulting changes may be either desirable or unde-
sirable depending on the performance metric used. Thus when this system is run, both the
mission and the control scheme used need consideration.
7.4 Scenarios
Three scenarios were used to demonstrate the ability of the architecture adapt to changes
in situation and accept external information. Where the operator was able to modify
mission parameters on the fly to reflect a new situation, performance for all control schemes
improved significantly.
In the scenarios where external information was added to the system, via fixed sensors
and target observations, the performance benefit varied depending on the control scheme
used. Additional information did not necessarily improve performance. This indicates a
controller-belief interaction that cannot be described as ‘more information equals better
performance’ and the requires further investigation.
7.5 Future Work
The framework for human-robot cooperation has been shown to be a useful approach to tack-
ling the problem of single operator, multiple platform control for an information gathering
mission. However within the scope of this thesis it has been impossible to fully characterise
the system developed. Application of the framework to different environments, tasks where
information is gathered in support of other activities and tasks where the objective is not
defined in terms of information states is left as future work.
Running the entire simulation on a single CPU lead to severe limitations in computational
power. The nature of the road network and tracker makes the system complex even with
10 targets. When combined with the computational resources required to run multiple
autopilots, ground vehicle models and motion models, the simulation quickly bogs down
on a single processor. By distributing modules to different CPUs as would be done in
a real system, such as with a CPU per autopilot, larger more complex scenarios may be
investigated. This is again left to future work.
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The results for the 2 scenarios in which external information is added to the system pose
a number of questions for future work. The beahviour observed indicates that additional
information may harm the system’s performance, depending on the control scheme adopted.
This runs counter to the principle of using information gain as utility, though may reinforce
the importance or valuing information. To properly examine the behaviour observed, it
needs to be determined whether it is specific to the scenario used as an example or whether
it is a trend more widely observed. Changes should include static sensor placement and
observation area, additional targets and sensors, longer simulation time, UAVs flying fixed
patterns and additional external target observations. This too is left to future work.
Appendix A
Common Simulation Components
and Modules
A.1 Sensors
The sensor component contains all the functions and data required to generate observa-
tions for a single simulated sensor. Each sensor object in the simulation is associated to a
single UAV platform and is updated with new position and pose information each time the
platform updates its own position. On being triggered to generate an observation, the area
currently visible to the sensor, or footprint, is found from the current state of the platform
X and the fixed sensor Field Of View (FOV) parameters. The bounds of the footprint are
passed to Search state component for fusion of the null observation. If the true position of
a ground vehicle is within the current footprint a probabilistic target observation is created
and passed to the Tracker and Classifier components for fusion.
A.1.1 Sensor Footprint
The sensor footprint is determined by a coordinate transformation from the sensor frame
to the world frame. The sensor frame is defined relative to the UAV frame, which in turn
is known relative to the world frame. Sensors are fixed to the platform, simplifying the
transformation.
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The body frame of the UAV is defined relative to the fixed world frame via origin x,y,z
nominally attached to the platform Centre of Gravity (CG). The orientation of the UAV
body, b, relative to the world frame, w, is given by the transformation matrix shown in
Equation A.1 where s(.) is sin(.) and c(.) is cos(.).
Cwb =

cθcψ cθsψ −sθ
−cφsψ + sφsθcψ cφcψ + sφsθsψ sφsφ
sφsψ + cφsθcψ −sφcψ + cφsθsψ cφcθ
 (A.1)
− Subscript b represents the body frame.
− Superscript w the world frame.
− ψ yaw angle of the platform.
− θ pitch angle of the platform.
− φ roll, or bank angle of the platform.
The transformation matrix for world frame to the UAV frame is the matrix transpose shown
in Equation A.2.
Cbw = C
wT
b (A.2)
A coordinate in the body frame can be transformed to world frame coordinates via the
transformation shown in Equation A.3.
Pwt = C
w
b P
b
t (A.3)
− Subscript t represents the target frame, which is the same as the world frame.
− P is the 3-dimensional coordinate vector.
Target observations are made in the sensor frame. As the sensor frame may have a different
orientation to the UAV body frame, a transformation to the body frame may be required.
The origin of both the sensor frame and body are both considered as nominally the platform
CG or P bt = P
s
t . All sensors are fixed relative to platform and are constrained to look in a
single direction. Thus the transformation matrix Cbs is the same as C
w
b shown in equation
A.1 Sensors 108
A.1 with fixed substitutions as shown in Equation A.4. The forward, down, half left/right
and left/right sensor orientations are shown visually in Appendix C with the respective
vectors shown in Equation A.4.

ψ
θ
φ
 =

0
−pi2
0
 ,

0
−pi4
0
 ,

±pi4
0
0
 ,

±pi2
0
0
 (A.4)
The complete transformation of observed coordinates to world coordinates is shown in
Equation A.5 where subscript s refers to the sensor frame.
Pwt = C
w
b C
b
sP
b
t (A.5)
In addition to dependance on Cwb and P
w
b , the sensor footprint is dependent on the sensor
FOV and location of the ground plane. The FOV is defined by a horizontal and vertical
angle designated as αh and αv respectively. The ground plane is designated by Zg.
The footprint is determined by projecting a unit vector from the sensor origin to each corner
of the sensor’s FOV. The azimuth and elevation of each unit vector can be determined as
shown below.
azimuth = ±αh
2
elevation = ± arctan(tan αv
2
cos (azimuth)) (A.6)
The FOV transformation matrix, or unit vector transformation matrix Csf , for each corner
can be determined by substituting the relevant azimuth and elevation into Equation A.1.
The subscript f identifies the transformation matrix as referring to a single corner of the
sensor’s FOV. The unit vector, nwfi, for each corner can be determined in the world frame
as shown in Equations A.7 and A.8.
nwfi = C
b
wC
s
bC
fi
s

1
0
0
 (A.7)
− i is the index of the unit vector, for a rectangular FOV i = 1 . . . 4.
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− ψ = azimuth
− θ = elevation
− φ = 0
To transform a coordinate or unit vector defined in the sensor frame to the world frame the
transformation below is used.
Pws = P
w
b + C
b
wP
b
s (A.8)
The sensor footprint can then be mapped onto the ground by projecting each unit vector
and determining the intersection with the ground plane. Solving the parametric equations
shown in Equation A.9 results in the x,y coordinates of the footprint corners in the world
frame.
x = x0 + at
y = y0 + bt (A.9)
Given the ground plane z = Zg, the substitution terms in Equation A.9 can be obtained
using Equations A.10 to A.12.
Pws =

x0
y0
z0
 (A.10)
nwfi =

a
b
c
 (A.11)
t =
Zg − z0
c
(A.12)
The target detection ability of a sensor and the probability is dynamically affected by the
pixel density pixel/m2. The instantaneous pixel density at a point within the footprint
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can be determined using the method outlined in Equations A.9 to A.12 and dividing the
projected FOV edges into n equidistant sections according to the resolution. If the sensor
pixels are nominally square then the pixel density, µ can be found from Equation A.13.
µ =
α¯h
nh
=
α¯v
nv
(A.13)
Taking into account the sensor height and pose, both of which are coupled to the UAV height
and pose, the angle between a unit vector anywhere in the footprint, α can be calculated.
Using the same notation from Equations A.10 and A.11 the pixel density κ can be found
via the Equation A.15.
α = arctan
√
a2 + b2
c
(A.14)
κ =
1
((Zg − z0) sec2(α)µ)2
(A.15)
The computational load of determining κ and a subsequent P (zt|xt) for each point in the
sensor’s footprint resulted in the simplification for κ shown in Equation A.16 being adopted.
In order to speed the computational process this approximation is applied over the whole
footprint.
κ =
np(
z2
0
tan(αh) tan(αv)
2
) (A.16)
− np is the number of pixels.
− h is the height of the UAV/Sensor above the ground plane Zg
A.1.2 Detection
The ability of the sensor to detect a particular ground vehicle type is a function of both the
sensor’s ability to ‘see’ the ground vehicle type and the number of resolved pixels across the
target. This later component is encapsulated in the Johnson criteria, J , which represents
the number of cycles or line pairs across the target.
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J =
κ
√
β
2
(A.17)
− J Johnson Criteria
− κ is the pixel density (see Equation A.16).
− β is the projected target area in m2
Empirical studies show that for a detection confidence of 0.9 in a cluttered environment,
a J value of between 4 and 17 is required [6]. These values relate to conspicuous and
non-conspicuous targets respectively.
Due to the computational load imposed during simulation, ta is kept constant and a de-
tectability function determined a priori for each sensor type. This is stored as a look up
table, relating J to P (zt|xt) values, which are then used to determine if the ground vehicle
within the sensor’s footprint is detected. The table is shown in Appendix C.
A.1.3 Localisation
The sensor’s ability to estimate a detected ground vehicles location is represented by a two
dimensional Gaussian as shown in Equation A.18.
G(x, y) =
1
2piσ2
e−
x2+y2
2σ2 (A.18)
To determine the location of the detected target, the true ground vehicle x and y are used
along with the σ defined in the model for the sensor type. An x and y value for the
detection is then selected with probability G from the distribution centered on the true
target location.
A.1.4 Classification
The sensor’s ability to estimate a detected ground vehicle’s type is represented by the
distribution P (zc|xc). Each sensor type has a unique discrimination function and these
are shown in Appendix C. To determine the classification of a detected ground vehicle, a
classification is selected with probability P (zc|xc) conditioned on the true vehicle state.
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A.1.5 No Detect
Each time an observation is made the footprint as calculated in A.1.1 is passed to the
Search State and Tracker for fusion as the ‘null observation’. As observations of ground
vehicles that fall within the footprint are handled separately, the null observation is the
sensor estimate of where no ground vehicles are present.
A.2 Platforms
The UAV platform component contains all the data and functions to simulate a single UAV
sensor platform. Each platform is associated with at least one sensor for which it provides
state updates. The UAV contains a number of subcomponents:
− The Guidance component takes waypoints and generates a desired height, bank angle
and speed command. The guidance loop is performed in simulation at 10Hz.
− The Autopilot component takes the guidance command and generates control inputs
for angular rates and throttle. This Autopilot loop is performed in simulation at 20Hz
− The Dynamic Model component takes the control inputs, and based on the platform
dynamic model generates a new state X for the UAV. The Dynamic Model loop is
performed in simulation at 20Hz with the new state at the end of each loop passed
back to the Autopilot component.
Two different UAV platform types are available in the simulation, as outlined in Appendix
C. Both types use the same subcomponents and functions, however limits and gains will be
unique to the type.
A.2.1 Guidance
The Guidance component takes either a single waypoint or list of waypoints, defined as a
three dimensional point, and the current UAV state X and generates a guidance command
shown below.
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guidance =

vd
zd
φd
 (A.19)
− vd is the desired airspeed, which is supplied as part of the waypoint.
− zd is the desired height, which is the z component of the waypoint.
− φd is the desired bank angle.
Each time the guidance loop is called, the distance to the current way point is checked. If
the waypoint has been reached a check is made for a new waypoint. If none is available the
guidance mode is switched to ‘orbit’ and a constant v˙, zd and φd applied until a new waypoint
becomes available. If the the current waypoint has not been reached, a Proportional Integral
(PI) control and φ limit is applied to the heading error to determine φd.
φd(s) = kφ(ψw − ψc) + 2(ψw − ψc)
s
(A.20)
− kφ is the proportional controller gain determined from a lookup table based on the
UAV current speed.
− ψw is the heading to the active waypoint from the current UAV position.
− ψc is the current UAV heading.
A.2.2 Autopilot
The Autopilot component takes guidance commands as described in Section A.2.1 and gen-
erates an autopilot command which defines the control rates to be applied to the platform.
autopilot =

θ˙
φ˙
v˙
 (A.21)
The guidance command is passed through height, speed, bank and pitch control functions
in order to generate the output in Equation A.21. For simulation it is assumed that all
turns will be coordinated, hence the Dynamic Model omits side slip effects and therefore
no rudder control, ψ˙, value is calculated.
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Height Control
The height control function is in two stages, first a demanded Rate Of Climb (ROC) is
determined using a proportional controller via Equation A.22, then this is converted to a
demanded pitch or climb angle, θ using Equation A.25.
z˙d = kh(zc − zd) (A.22)
− z˙d is the desired ROC
− kh is the proportional controller gain determined from a lookup table based on UAV
type and current speed.
− zc current height above the ground.
− zd desired height above the ground.
The desired flight path angle at the current speed is then calculated as shown below.
γd =
(
z˙c − z˙d
v
)
(A.23)
γe = γd − γc (A.24)
− γd is the flight path angle need to achieve the desired ROC from Equation A.22
− v is the current airspeed.
− zc current height above the ground.
− zd desired height above the ground.
− γe is the flight path angle error.
As the simplified Dynamic Model does not account for effects such as side slip or skidding
the current pitch angle is the current flight path angle, θc = γc. The desired pitch angle,
θd is then calculated using the γ values, before being passed through a limiting function as
shown in Equation A.25.
θd(s) = γd + γe +
0.1γe
s
(A.25)
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Pitch Control
The pitch controller uses the demanded pitch angle from the height controller to generate
a θ˙ command using the PI controller in Equation A.26.
θ˙(s) = kθ(θd − θc) + θd − θc
s
(A.26)
− θ˙ is the applied pitch rate.
− kθ is the pitch gain determined from a lookup table based on UAV type and current
speed.
− θd − θc is the pitch angle error.
Speed Control
The speed control control function is a lead-lag compensated error feed back loop. The v˙
error is passed through the lead-lag filter in Equation A.27.
G(s) =
s+ 0.1
s+ 0.01
(A.27)
The controller gain kv is determined from a lookup table based on UAV type and current
speed allowing the desired v˙ to be found via Equation A.28.
v˙ = kvG(s) (A.28)
Bank Angle Control
The bank angle controller is a gain scheduled proportional controller with gain kp determined
from a lookup table based on UAV type and current speed. The desired roll rate is found:
φ˙ = kp(φd − φc) (A.29)
− φ˙ is the applied roll rate.
− kp is the controller gain.
− φd − φc is the bank angle error.
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A.2.3 Dynamic Model
The Dynamic Model takes the applied control inputs from the Autopilot and the current
UAV state and applies a fourth order Runge-Kutta solution to the 6-DoF Ordinary Dif-
ferential Equation (ODE) of state. The general Runge-Kutta solution for the initial UAV
state Xn is found using Equation A.30.
Xn+1 = Xn +
1
6
(k1 + 2k2 + 2k3 + k4)dt (A.30)
k1 = Xndt
k2 = Xn + 0.5k1dt
k3 = Xn + 0.5k2dt
k4 = Xn + k3dt
(A.31)
Where dt is the incremental time step, for simulation purposed a constant value of 0.1 was
used.
The control input from the Autopilot in Equation A.21 is assumed constant over the time
step dt. As the applied v˙, θ˙ and φ˙ values are supplied the remaining velocities can be
calculated and the k values determined via:
x˙ = vc cos θc cosψc
y˙ = vc cos θc sinψc
z˙ = vc tan θc
ψ˙ =
tanφc(vc tan θ˙+9.81)
vc
(A.32)
The output state Xn + 1 is then applied as the current state Xn of the platform for the
next Autopilot/Dynamic Model loop.
A.3 Ground Vehicles
The Ground Vehicle component contains all the functions and data required to simulate
a single ground vehicle. Each Ground Vehicle contains Guidance and Motion Model com-
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ponents which control position, along with static characteristics which are unique to each
type. The various vehicle type are outlined in Appendix C.
The target type, size and conspicuousness may be used in conjunction with Equations A.17
and the table in Appendix C to determine the detection probability. However due to the
computational load for running the entire simulation on a single processor, the properties
size and conspicuousness properties were not used for the simulation results shown in Section
6.4.
A.3.1 Motion Model
Ground vehicles are restricted to moving along the urban road network shown in Appendix
C. The network is discretised into nodes, where each node is nominally placed at a 1m
interval along the road. Each node is given a unique identifier with a connectivity map
indicating which nodes are connected and in what direction. These directions are shown in
Appendix C.
During each Motion Model loop the ground vehicle centroid is moved forward along the
network, by the number of nodes specified by the time interval and the vehicle velocity.
The velocity for each vehicle type is give in Appendix C and the Motion Model loop is run
at 20Hz.
A.3.2 Guidance
The Guidance subcomponent has two different modes of operation, random and path. If the
current mode is set to random, on reaching an intersection node a new direction is chosen
randomly subject to the propagation filter shown in Appendix C.
The Guidance subcomponent can hold a list of waypoints. A path from the current position
to the next waypoint in the list can be found using the A∗ algorithm. The output of the A∗
algorithm is a set of intersection nodes and the subsequent path nodes, which are stored.
If the current Guidance mode is set to path, then on reaching an intersection the new
direction is defined by the stored next path node. If the waypoint is reached and there
are waypoints yet to be visited a new path to the next waypoint is found, however if no
unvisited waypoints remain, the Guidance mode is forced to random.
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The A∗ algorithm is the recursive application of the function in Equation A.33
f ′(n) = g(n) + h′(n) (A.33)
− g(n) is the total distance travelled from the path start point to the current location.
− h′(n) is the estimated distance from the current position to the waypoint determined
through a heuristic function.
− f ′(n) is the current estimate of the shortest path.
The final path f(n) is equal to f ′(n) once the algorithm has finished. The heuristic used
for estimating the distance to the waypoint is shown in Equation A.34.
h
′
x¯>y¯(n) = |x¯|+ 0.4 |y¯|
h
′
x¯<y¯(n) = 1.4 |y¯|
(A.34)
− x¯ is the distance from the current position to the waypoint along the x axis.
− y¯ is the distance from the current position to the waypoint along the y axis.
A.4 Tracker
The Target Tracking Module is part of the Level 2 Data Fusion functionality and is respon-
sible for providing the current bc and future belief bf of the location of all ground vehicles
detected. The complete track component of the belief Bt is a vector of q probability dis-
tributions, where q is the number of ground vehicles that have been observed. If a tracked
ground vehicle’s position is given by the variable xt the belief state is:
Bt = [P (xt1) . . . P (x
t
q)] (A.35)
The distribution P (xt) represents the probability of the tracked target being at any given
node in the map. The belief of the target’s position given all observations made up to time
k can be found using Equation A.36.
bk(xt) = P (xt|ztk, ztk−1, . . . , z1) (A.36)
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Assuming the ground vehicle’s motion is Markovian, Equation A.36 can be calculated re-
cursively using Bayes rule as in Equation A.37 .
bk(xt) = P (xtk|zt1:k)
= KP (ztk|xtk)P (xtk|xk−1, zt1:k−1)
= Kp(ztk|xtk)P (xtk|xtk−1)P (xtk−1|zt1:k−1) (A.37)
Where the prior P (xtk−1|zt1:k−1) is the posterior from the previous recursion and K is a
normalising constant.
A.4.1 Prediction
As the ground vehicle will not necessarily be observed at each k, a prediction of the state
xt provides the current belief estimate when no observation is available and may be used to
generate the future belief estimate. The propagation of P (xt) is governed by the Chapman-
Kolmogorov and Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equations, for the continuous and discrete cases
respectively. The predicted belief state can be found:
bk+1(xt) = P (xtk+1|zt1:k)
= K
∫
P (xtk+1|xtk)P (xtk|zt1:k)dxk (A.38)
Where P (xk+1|xk) is the target’s motion model. The setup of the module allows prediction
of P (xt) to the UAV planning horizon.
A.4.2 Update
When an observation is available, the belief is updated using Bayes theorem in Equation
A.39.
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bk+1(xt) = P (xtk+1|zt1:k+1)
= KP (ztk+1|xtk+1)P (xtk+1|zt1:k) (A.39)
If observations are available from multiple sensors and each is conditionally independent
given the true state of xt, then ztk+1 =
[
z1k+1 . . . z
r
k+1
]
. The update, Equation A.39 can then
be rewritten as in Equation A.40.
bk+1(xt) = P (xtk+1|zt1:k+1)
= KP (xtk+1|zt1:k)
r∏
i=1
P (ztik+1|xtk+1) (A.40)
A.4.3 The Particle Filter
Initialisation
The Track prediction and update are implemented in a multi-hypothesis framework, using
a particle filter approach. On observation of a previously unknown ground vehicle a new
track is created to represent the distribution P (xtq). The track consists of a fixed number of
particles where each particle represents a hypothesis of the true target location xtq and type
xcq. The initial particle locations are assigned according to the sensor’s localisation model
as discussed in Section A.1.3 and the classification model discussed in Section A.1.4. The
number of particles assigned to a point x is found from Equation A.41.
|hx,m| = G(xx, xy)P (xcm)|H|∀m ∈ C (A.41)
Propagation
The belief of target classification will be constant with respect to time, hence each particle
is propagated according to Equation A.38, where the motion model used is model for the
type assigned to the particle. At road junctions, the direction for propagation is chosen
randomly, subject to the direction filter shown in Appendix C.
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Update
When an observation becomes available of a ground vehicle in track, a new set of particles is
created as for initialisation where |h|  |H|. Then each original particle is updated accord-
ing to Equation A.39 using the joint probabilities P (zk+1|xtk+1,xc) and P (xtk+1,xc|z1:k).
The new particle set is normalised and the |h| particles with the lowest P (xt,xc) are removed
from the set |H| before renormalisation.
When the null observation corresponding to a particles position becomes available the new
probability for the hypothesis is determined by Equation A.39 where the sensor model
applied is P (zs|xs) = 1−P (zt|xt). If the probability falls below a threshold it is set to zero
and removed from the set to be propagated in the net time step. The particle probabilities
are then renormalised.
A.5 Classifier
The Target Classifier Module is part of the Level 2 Data Fusion functionality and is re-
sponsible for providing the classification belief of all ground vehicles detected. The classify
component of Bc is a vector of q probability distributions, where q is the number of targets
currently being tracked by the Target Tracking Module.
Bc = [P (xc1) . . . P (x
c
q)] (A.42)
The distribution P (xc) is the probability of the true ground vehicle type taken over all
possible types. The classification update is performed via a recursive application of the
Bayes update equation:
P (xc|zc) = P (z
c|xc)P (x)
P (zc)
(A.43)
Given the observation zc is received by the Classifier the classification estimate can be
obtained from Equation A.50.
P (xc|zck) = KP (zck|xc)P (xc) (A.44)
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Where K is a normalising factor and P (xc) is the estimate of the classification prior to
the update. This is initially the uninformed distribution over all target types, while for
all subsequent updates the posterior P (xc|zck) from the previous update is used as the new
prior. The sensor model P (z|xc) is known for each sensor type a priori and stored as a
likelihood matrix. See Appendix C for details of the different sensor models.
If observations are available from multiple sensors within the same time step k and each
is conditionally independent given the true state of xc, then zck+1 =
[
z1k+1 . . . z
r
k+1
]
. The
update equation can be written:
P (xc|zck) = [P (zck)−1P (xc)
r∏
i=1
P (zci |xc) (A.45)
In the implemented Classifier and Tracker, correct observation to track is assumed. Hence
the interaction between the Classifier and Track is limited to selection of the number of
particles to assign to a particular motion model based on the classification probability.
A.5.1 Classification Sets
The ground vehicle types are grouped into predefined classification sets. These sets are
used in constructing the mission for the task based control and for threat definition in value
based control. Instead of assigning priority or threat to an individual type the operator
may assign it to one of the sets and deal with the set as if it were a single type.
The probability of membership of set C is the sum of probabilities for each member of the
set as shown in Equation A.46.
P (xC) =
∑
m
P (xcm)∀m ∈ C (A.46)
The predefined classification sets are outlined in Appendix C.
A.6 Search State
The Search component is part of the Level 2 Data Fusion functionality and is responsible
for providing the current bc and future belief bf of the location of ground vehicles that have
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yet to be observed. The complete search component Bs is a probability map over all points
within the area of operation.
Bs =
S∑
n=1
P (xsn) (A.47)
In the urban security mission defined in Section 3.4 the number, or indeed existence, of
ground vehicles in the area of operation is unknown a priori. This makes setting up the
search distribution and assessing the initial of P (xs) difficult, particularly in relation to
finding appropriate priors. As a result the state of search task is represented as the dis-
tribution P (xs) over the entire area of operation conditioned on the existence of a single
previously unobserved ground vehicle. When a ground vehicle is detected it is immediately
handed off to the Track and Classification components and a null observation passed to the
Search State component.
A.6.1 Predict
As only a small section of the area of operation is observed at any time, the prediction of
the state xs provides the current belief estimate for the unobserved areas and may be used
to generate the future belief estimate. The propagation of P (xs) is nominally governed by
the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation as for the track state in Equation A.38. However given
no a priori information on location, number or type of vehicles, then each type and possible
location needs to be propagated to time k. This is computationally intractable for the node
network map, therefore a time constant information decay is applied according to Equation
A.48 where τ is the decay constant.
P (xsk−1|xsk) = P (xsk)τdt (A.48)
A.6.2 Update
The classification update is performed via a recursive application of the Bayes update
equation:
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P (xs|zs) = P (z
s|xs)P (x)
P (zs)
(A.49)
Given the null target observation zs is received the updated estimate can be obtained from
Equation A.50.
P (xs|zsk) = KP (zsk|xs)P (xs) (A.50)
Where K is a normalising factor and P (xs) is the estimate of the classification prior to the
update. This is initially the uninformed distribution over the area of operation, while for
all subsequent updates the posterior P (xs|zsk) from the previous update is used as the new
prior. The value of P (zs|xc) is related to the detection probability outlined in Section A.1.2
by Equation A.51.
P (zs|xs) = 1− P (zt|xt) (A.51)
Appendix B
Task Based Control
B.1 Framework Components
B.1.1 Organization
The decision process performed at the Organization level can be summarized as the map-
ping:
O :Mc ×Md × P× Ah × Ph → (A,W) (B.1)
− Mc is the current state of the mission derived from the the world belief state B.
− Md is the desired mission state derived from the operator input and the the structure
of the mission M .
− P is the set of priorities associated with task types.
P = {ptq, pcq, ps}∀q = 1 . . .Q (B.2)
− ptq and pcq are the priority for tracking and classifying the qth target type and ps is the
priority of search for the whole area of operation.
− Ah is set of additional tasks as a result of Level 3 data fusion.
− Ph is the set of priorities associated to tasks specified by the operator which for this
implementation is the search of areas around protected assets.
Ph = {pSa, . . .} (B.3)
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− pSa is priority for searching the sub area associated with the ath asset.
− A is the unified set of tasks.
− W is the set of weights associated with the set A.
B.1.2 Coordination
In line with the concept of IPDI, the Coordination level deals with a lower level of task
abstraction than the Organiser. The first stage of the Coordination process is allocation of
the task set, A, to the available resources. This results in the allocated task set Υ
C : W× A→ Υ (B.4)
Certain tasks may be assigned to multiple platforms or sensors and may need to be coordi-
nated in time and/or space. This is the second stage of the coordination process. For tasks
which include parameters such as simultaneous arrival or observing a target from different
angles, the time and space coordination may require multiple iterations of the path plan for
each platform.
B.2 Modules
The task based control scheme is implemented in code as the modules shown in Figure B.1.
These modules are discussed in the following sections.
B.3 Organiser
The Organiser performs the mapping shown in Equation B.1 in stages, with responsibility
for the different stages divided between the Mission and Mission Planner modules.
− Interface with the operator to capture and store the mission parameters.
− Evaluate the current and desired mission states.
− Create the current task pool from the current belief and mission, adding any other
tasks specified by the operator.
− Calculate a weighting for each task in the current task pool.
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Value Controller Block
Mission 
Planning Module
Organiser 
Module
Coordination 
Module
UAV Path 
Planner Module
Figure B.1: Software modules for tasked based control.
B.4 Mission Module
The Mission Module provides the interface for the operator to enter and modify mission
parameters. These parameters are maintained as the mission object M , which consists of
three components corresponding to the search, track and classify objectives.
M =
[
Ms,Mt,Mc
]
(B.5)
Search Ms
The Search component of the mission consists of the operator defined parameters ‘Priority’
and ‘Likelihood’ for the General Search task and any Area Search tasks.
When entering the priority and likelihood parameters, the operator is able to specify whether
they apply to the entire area of operation, S or a specific area S. In the security scenario,
S will normally be an area surrounding a protected asset.
The priority term is assigned according to one of the descriptions shown in Equation B.6. A
numerical value corresponding to the human level description is then automatically applied
and stored in the mission object.
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ps = |No Impact, Some Impact, Desirable, Highly Desirable, Mission Critical| (B.6)
It is desirable that the values corresponding to each descriptive level are assigned by a
human with high level knowledge of the situation, or extracted from historical data. The
corresponding numerical values are applied as either the linear set 1 . . . 5 or the logarithmic
set 21 . . . 25.
The ‘Likelihood’ describes the desired maximum likelihood of the presence of an undetected
target being present at any point in either S or S.
Track Mt
The Track component consists of the operator defined parameters ‘Priority’ and ‘Track
Variance’ for each ground vehicle type. The ‘Priority’ term is assigned, as for search,
according to selected priority level shown in Equation B.6. The desired track variance in
m, for the target type is entered directly by the operator
Classify Mc
The Classification component consists of the operator defined parameters ‘Priority’ and
‘Classification Threshold’ for each target type. The priority term is again assigned according
to the levels in Equation B.6.
The classification threshold is entered directly by the operator. If the vehicle type prob-
ability of of a tracked target reaches this threshold the target is considered to have been
classified.
B.5 Mission Planning Module
The Mission Planning Module generates a current mission state Mc based on the system
belief B and a desired mission state Md based on the parameters in the mission object
M . These mission states are then mapped to a set of tasks and associated priorities as
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per equation B.1. From section B.4, the mission M consists of search, track and classify
components.
M = f [(σ2trk|xc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Track
, Pmin(xc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Classification
, Pmax(xs|S), Pmax(xs|S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Search
] (B.7)
Where the priority for each search, track or classify task is determined from the priority p
applied by the operator from Equation B.6.
B.5.1 Current Mission State Mc
The current mission state is defined by the Hellinger-Bhattacharya distance between the
current distribution P (x) and the naive or flat distribution. For two discrete distributions
P (xai ) and P (x
b
i) of length i, the distance δ is fund using Equation B.8.
δ
(
P (xai ), P (x
b
i)
)
=
[∑
i
(
P (xai )
0.5 − P (xbi)0.5
)2]0.5
(B.8)
The naive distribution is constant, hence δ is determined via the Hellinger-Bhattacharya
(HB) affinity to allow the distributions to be handled separately. The HB affinity α for a
discrete distribution of n possible states is shown in Equation B.9.
α = 2 log
n∑
i=1
√
P (xi)
n
(B.9)
The affinity in Equation B.9 has an associated HB distance shown below.
δα = 2(1− e0.5α) (B.10)
The distance between the distributions is then found using equation B.11.
δ = δaα − δbα (B.11)
B.5 Mission Planning Module 130
Search
The state of general search component of the mission can be obtained by finding the HB
distance of the P (xs) from a uniform distribution of the same length using the Equations
B.9 to B.11.
Msc = δsα − δUα (B.12)
Where δU is the HB distance of an uniform distribution with length |S|.
The area search component of the current mission state is the set of the individual search
states of all areas S specified by the operator.
Msc =
∣∣Msc(S)i∣∣∀i = 1 . . . A (B.13)
Where A is the set of search areas specified by the operator. The distribution associated
with the points in S can be extracted from the main search map P (xs) as S ⊂ S.
Msc(S) = δsα − δUα
= 2
1− elog |S|∑i=1
√
P (xs∈S)
|S|
− δUα (B.14)
Track
The track component of the current mission state is the set of individual track states of all
ground vehicles being tracked by the system.
Mtc =
∣∣Mtc(q)∣∣∀q ∈ Q (B.15)
Where Q is the set of all ground vehicles in track. The track distribution for target q
is obtained from P (xt) with the distribution length |S|. The uniform distribution for the
tracker implemented consists of g points with P (xt) = 1g where g is equal to the number of
particles used by the tracker and |S| − g points where P (xt) = 0.
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Classify
The classification component of the current mission state is the set of individual classification
states of all ground vehicles being tracked.
Mcc = |Mcc(q)| ∀q ∈ Q (B.16)
Where Q is the set of all ground vehicles in track. The classification distribution for target
q is obtained from P (xc) and δUα is the uniform distribution over all possible ground vehicle
types.
B.5.2 Desired Mission State Md
The desired mission state is based on the operator preferences captured by the mission
module. A desired distribution for the search, track and classify components is created
according to the parameters in M . The HB distance of the resulting distribution from the
naive equivalent is stored as the desired mission state.
Search
The desired state of the general search component is defined by the operators specified
maximum likelihood for detecting a previously unknown target at any point the area of
operation or Pmax(xs). The desired distribution for the assumption of one unknown target
is found from Equation B.17.
P (xs) =

Pmax(xs)
|S|−1 for |S| − 1 points
1− Pmax(xs) for 1 point
(B.17)
For the uniform distribution P (xs) = 1|S| for all points.
The area search component of the desired mission state is the set of the individual desired
search states of all areas S specified by the operator.
Msd =
∣∣Msd(S)i∣∣ ∀i = 1 . . . A (B.18)
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Where A is the set of search areas specified by the operator. The distribution associated
with each area in A is found in a similar manner to Equation B.17, where S ⊂ S and the
total distribution length is |S|. The desired distribution can then be construction from the
operator assigned value for PAmax(x
s).
PA(xs) =

Pmax(xs)
|S|−1 for |S| − 1 points
1− Pmax(xs) for 1 point
(B.19)
For the uniform distribution PA(xs) = 1|S| . The desired mission state for the area S can
then be found.
Msd(S) = δsα − δUα
= 2
1− elog |S|∑i=1
√
PA(xs∈S)
|S|
− δUα (B.20)
Track
The desired state for the track component of the mission is the set of individual track states
for each ground vehicle in track.
Mtd =
∣∣Mtd(q)∣∣ ∀q ∈ Q (B.21)
The desired track distribution is defined by the track variance σ2max specified for the target
q. A Gaussian distribution over g points with σ2 = σ2max is constructed where g is the
number of particles used by the tracker to estimate the location of a single target.
P (xt) =
 1σ√2pie−0.5(
x−µ
σ )
2
for x ∈ (−g2 , g2) points
0 for all x /∈ g
(B.22)
The length of the distribution is |S| where x ∈ S. The uniform distribution is that same as
used for comparison of the current mission track state.
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Classification
The desired state for the classification component of the mission is the set of individual
classification states for each ground vehicle in track.
Mcd = |Mcd(q)| ∀q ∈ Q (B.23)
The desired classification distribution for target q is obtained described by the classification
threshold Pmin(x) specified for q by the operator.
P (xc) =
 Pmmin(xci ) for i = 1 . . .m− 11−Pmmin(xci )
|m|−1 for i = m
(B.24)
Where m is the set of all possible ground vehicle types. The uniform distribution over all
possible ground vehicle types or P (xc) = 1|m| is used to find δ
U
α .
B.5.3 Task Generation
The purpose of the task generation component of the Mission Planning Module is to generate
the task pool A from the belief state B. A task or set of tasks is generated for each of the
mission components of search track and classify as appropriate, considering also the ground
vehicles being tracked and what is known about each.
Any tasks contained in the set Ah, are added or removed from the task pool at the discretion
of the operator. If a human generated task ah conflicts with an automatically generated
task, the system generated task is removed from the pool until reinstated by the operator’s
removal of the conflicting task.
Search
The probability of a previously undetected target being at any point within the area of
operation is maintained as the search state P (xs) as detailed in Appendix A. This gives rise
to the general search task as which can be defined as maintain the probability for detecting
a previously unseen target, at any point in the area of operation, below the threshold set by
the operator. The parameters of the general search task are given by ms
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ms = f [ps, Pmax(xs|S)] (B.25)
− xs is the state variable representing the existence of a previously undetected target at
node s.
− Pmax(xs|S) is the operator specified desired likelihood of detecting a previously unde-
tected target in the area of operation.
− ps is the operator assigned priority assigned to the general search objective.
Area Search
The general search task, which relates to the entire area of operation, has a single operator
applied priority and threshold. Searching the area around any protected asset is treated as
a separate task to general search and is included as part of the set Ah.
The area search task aS is dealt with in the same way as general search with the associated
mission components taking the same form as Equation B.25. However the priority and
threshold values applied by the operator only apply to the area S where S ∈ S.
ms = f [psS , Pmax(x
s|S)] (B.26)
The general search task as is generated when the system is initialised along with an area
search task asS for each asset in the area of operation.
Track
When an observation is made of a ground vehicle, the position estimate is passed to the
tracking component which maintains the track estimate P (xtq) for all q detected targets.
This is detailed in Appendix A. The track task can then be defined as reduce the uncertainty
regarding the location of tracked target q. Hence for each of q observed targets a track task
atq defined by m
t is generated.
mt = f [ptc, (σ
2
c |xcq), P (xcq)]∀c = 1 . . .C (B.27)
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− ptc is the assigned priority for tracking a given target type or set of types c.
− xcq is the state variable indicating the classification of the qth target.
− σ2c is the desired maximum variance for tracks belonging to the classification set c.
The desired track variance indicates the desired upper bound of uncertainty in a detected
target’s position. Both desired track variance and priority can be assigned on target type
or classification set as in Section B.5.3 and Appendix A.
The area to be observed for each atq is found by using the future belief state bf for the track
of target q at the planning horizon.
Target Track
The track task atq defines the track priority and desired track state with respect to the target
type. If different parameters define the desired track state for a specific target q, then the
track task generated for the target q will be treated as part of the additional task set Ah.
mtq = f [p
t
q, (σ
2
q |xcq), P (xcq)] (B.28)
− ptq is the operator assigned priority for tracking target q.
− xcq is the state variable indicating the classification of target q.
− σ2q is the desired maximum variance for the track of target q.
Classify
When an observation of a ground vehicle is made, the target type estimate is passed to the
classification component which maintains the classification for each track. This is detailed
in Appendix A. The classify task acq can then be defined as reduce the uncertainty regarding
the classification of target q given it is of the type m. Hence for each of q observed targets
a classification task acq defined by m
c is generated. However as the task parameters are a
function of the type of ground vehicle, the true task parameters often cannot be determined
prior to the task being completed. As a result the classification supersets described in
Appendix A are used to find mc. The classification task for target q inherits the priority
B.5 Mission Planning Module 136
and threshold values for the superset c for which it has the highest probability of being a
member.
mc = f [pcc, Pmin(x
c
c|xcq)]∀c = 1 . . . C (B.29)
− pcc is the operator assigned priority for the set of types c
− xcq is the state variable representing the classification of the qth target.
− xcc is the state variable representing the classification of the qth target with respect to
the classification group on which the threshold is defined.
If the classification probability exceeds the specified Pmin(xcq) value for the target then the
associated classify task is removed.
Classify Target
The track task acq defines the classification priority and threshold with respect to the prob-
ability of membership to a classification superset. If different parameters define the desired
classification state for a specific target q, then the classification task generated for the target
q will be treated as part of the additional task set Ah.
mcq = f [p
c
q, Pmin(x
c
q] (B.30)
− pcq is the operator assigned priority for the target q
− xcq is the state variable representing the classification of the qth target.
B.5.4 Task Weights
The task weight is a function of three components reflecting the priority/criticality of the
information, the desired uncertainty of the information and the preference between the
different information types.
wa =
 paRM¯a for Mad >Mac0 for Mad ≤Mac (B.31)
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Where pa is the operator assigned priority relevant to the task a, R is the information type
preference and M¯a is difference between the current and desired information distributions as
described in Sections B.5.1 and B.5.2. The term M¯a is thus the marginalised HB distance
between the desired and current distributions of the x relevant to the task, as shown in
Equation B.32
M¯a = M
a
d −Mac
Mad
(B.32)
By using the same priority structure for search, track and classify the issue of information
type preference is partially addressed. However due to the influence of the physical area
covered by P (x) in determining the M¯a value, tasks associated with a small physical area
will typically have very high weighting compared to those such as the general search task
which cover a much larger areas. Thus in order to make the information types preferentially
independent [21] the preference term R is added to the task weighting function. The value
of R is then the ratio of the physical area associated with the P (x) relevant to the task, to
the area covered by the general search task.
B.6 Coordination Module
The role of the Coordination Module is to efficiently allocate the tasks generated by the
Organiser Module to the available resources and provided coordination mechanism between
platforms, where necessary to complete the task. In addition to the task list A and weights
W provided by the Organiser, the Coordinator uses information such as sensor accuracy,
modalities, coverage and platform characteristics to determine the optimal task allocation.
At this level, the task pool A is considered as a whole and thus does not make any distinction
between human generated tasks or system generated task.
B.6.1 Task Allocation
Given the the task pool A and the associated set of weights W, the task allocation process
seeks to optimise the mapping in Equation B.33.
C : W× A→ Υ (B.33)
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Where Υ is an ordered set of task to resource assignments, with the first element correspond-
ing to the first agent. The optimization process seeks to maximize the objective function
J (Υ), where Υ contains all tasks assigned in the current planning cycle. The objective
function for a single task is described by Equation B.34.
J (a) = f(η(Γ, a), γ(Π, a), κ(X, a)) (B.34)
− a is an individual task to be allocated.
− Γ is the suitability of a given sensor for the task a.
− Π is the suitability of the platform for the task a.
− X is the current state of the sensor/platform being tested for assignment.
1. η(Γ, a) The suitability of the sensor for the task.
− For tracking tasks the suitability score is defined by the sensor’s localisation
ability. The upper bound is given by the distribution of the true ground vehicle
location given that it is observed at point x or P (zx|xx). The score for tracking
a target the is determined by the HB distance between this distribution and a
uniform distribution.
− For classification tasks the suitability score is defined by the sensor’s ability to
discriminate between target types. The upper bound is given by the sensor model
P (zc|xcm), where m is the true ground vehicle type. The score for classifying a
target of type m is determined by the HB distance between this distribution and
a uniform distribution.
− For search tasks the suitability score is the probability of detecting a ground
vehicle given that it is present in the observation or P (zt|xt). This probability
of detection is discussed in detail in section A.1.2.
2. γ(Π, a) The platform suitability describes the relative ability of the sensor platform
to place the sensor in a position to make the observations required by the task. For
example traversability, size, speed or noise signature limitations may reduce the effec-
tiveness or even prevent the agent from making the observations required to accom-
plish a. For the airborne sensors implemented in the simulation the various platform’s
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suitability for all tasks is assumed to be comparable and thus this component is not
used in the objective function.
3. κ(X, a) The current state of the platform will affect when a task can be started and
the expected time to completion. Further, certain platform states may prevent the
task from being performed. In the system implemented, only the agent’s position is
considered, with platforms closest to the area associated with the task receiving the
highest suitability score.
For the task list A the utility for each possible agent j assigned to a task is found via
Equation B.35.
U(aji ) = η(Sj , ai)× γ(Xj , ai)× wi (B.35)
If an agent is limited to a single task assignment for the current planning cycle then for i
tasks assigned to j resources, where i <= j, the best utility for Υ is obtained by Equation
B.36.
maxUΥ =
∑
j
(maxua|aij) (B.36)
A person-by-person optimization [33] process is used to obtain a pareto optimal allocation
for Equation B.36. This process is outlined in B.6.1.
1. Assign task with highest utility gain to each agent
2. If multiple agents are assigned to the same task, the new individual
agent utility is the maximum utility for the task divided by the
number of agents assigned
3. Calculate the group utility
4. For 1 . . . j agents
For 1 . . . i tasks
Assign ai to agent j
Calculate new group utility
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If new group utility > old group utility
Update allocated task list with aij
Old group utility = new group utility
5. Return final allocated task list Υ
B.6.2 Path Planner
Once the set Υ has been filled, the Path Planner determines the best waypoint/s for each
agent in order to accomplish the assigned task ,taking into consideration platform and sensor
capability. This is done in a number of stages with the resulting waypoint/s then passed to
the agent controllers for execution.
1. The bounding agent states reachable at time k are found from the platform manoeuvre
envelope, corresponding to maximum and minimum control inputs applied to the
current state X.
2. Five intervening states are selected at even intervals between the bounding states and
the sensor footprint for each of the resulting seven possible future states found.
3. The P (x) of interest is projected to time k.
4. For each sensor footprint the probability of observing the true state of xk is then
found.
5. The pose corresponding to the footprint with the best P (z|xk) is then used to define
a waypoint which is communicated to the agents guidance module.
6. If the footprints yield a zero probability of detecting the true state, then the control
input resulting in the agent moving closest to the area associated with a is chosen.
For both the track and classify tasks this is the P (xt) weighted centroid of the track
estimate. For the area search task this is the centre of the area.
Appendix C
Models and Parameters
Figure C.1: Aerial photo of the Sydney CBD left and the road network used by the simulator
right.
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Figure C.2: Template showing the distances and the 8 possible direction nodes can be
connected. The numbers in the square boxes are used as a column index in a matrix used
to store the map.
Figure C.3: Template showing the orientation assigned to a ground vehicle based on the
direction it enters the current node.
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Figure C.4: Direction filter for propagation of Ground Vehicles at intersections. Direction
of node arriving from is shown in blue, the permitted directions of travel are shown in red.
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C.1.1 Ground Vehicle Types
Truck, Light, Civilian
Average Speed 6.5m/s
Projected Area 11.0m2
System Enum 0
Conspicuous
Truck, Light, Blue Forces
Average Speed 6.0m/s
Projected Area 12.0m2
System Enum 1
Inconspicuous
Truck, Light, Red Forces
Average Speed 6.0m/s
Projected Area 12.0m2
System Enum 2
Inconspicuous
Truck, Medium, Civilian
Average Speed 5.5m/s
Projected Area 18.0m2
System Enum 3
Conspicuous
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Truck, Medium, Blue Forces
Average Speed 5.0m/s
Projected Area 22.0m2
System Enum 4
Conspicuous
Truck, Medium, Red Forces
Average Speed 5.0m/s
Projected Area 24.0m2
System Enum 5
Conspicuous
Truck, Heavy, Civilian
Average Speed 4.5m/s
Projected Area 36.0m2
System Enum 6
Conspicuous
Truck, Heavy, Blue Forces
Average Speed 4.0m/s
Projected Area 42.0m2
System Enum 7
Inconspicuous
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Truck, Heavy, Red Forces
Average Speed 4.0m/s
Projected Area 42.0m2
System Enum 8
Inconspicuous
4WD, Civilian
Average Speed 8.5m/s
Projected Area 9.0m2
System Enum 9
Conspicuous
4WD, Blue Forces
Average Speed 8.0m/s
Projected Area 8.5m2
System Enum 10
Inconspicuous
4WD, Red
Average Speed 8.0m/s
Projected Area 7.5m2
System Enum 11
Inconspicuous
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4WD, Militia
Average Speed 8.5m/s
Projected Area 7.5m2
System Enum 12
Conspicuous
Motorbike, Civilian
Average Speed 10.0m/s
Projected Area 2.0m2
System Enum 13
Conspicuous
Motorbike, Militia
Average Speed 10.0m/s
Projected Area 2.0m2
System Enum 14
Conspicuous
Car, Civilian
Average Speed 9.0m/s
Projected Area 7.0m2
System Enum 15
Conspicuous
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Car, Blue Forces
Average Speed 8.5m/s
Projected Area 7.5m2
System Enum 16
Conspicuous
Car, Red Forces
Average Speed 8.5m/s
Projected Area 7.5m2
System Enum 17
Conspicuous
Car, Militia
Average Speed 9.0m/s
Projected Area 6.5m2
System Enum 18
Conspicuous
Armour, Light, Blue
Average Speed 6.5m/s
Projected Area 19.0m2
System Enum 19
Inconspicuous
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Armour, Light, Red
Average Speed 6.5m/s
Projected Area 21.0m2
System Enum 20
Inconspicuous
Armour, Heavy, Blue
Average Speed 5.5m/s
Projected Area 36.0m2
System Enum 21
Inconspicuous
Armour, IFV, Blue
Average Speed 6.0m/s
Projected Area 21.0m2
System Enum 22
Inconspicuous
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C.1.2 Classification Groups and Membership
Unarmoured Armed Friendly Light Vehicle
Truck, Light, Civilian Truck, Heavy, Blue Forces Truck, Light, Civilian 4WD, Civilian
Truck, Light, Blue Forces Truck, Heavy, Red Forces Truck, Light, Blue Forces 4WD, Blue Forces
Truck, Light, Red Forces 4WD, Blue Forces Truck, Medium, Civilian 4WD, Red Forces
Truck, Medium, Civilian 4WD, Red Forces Truck, Medium, Blue Forces 4WD, Militia
Truck, Medium, Blue Forces 4WD, Militia Truck, Heavy, Civilian Motorbike, Civilian
Truck, Medium, Red Forces Motorbike, Militia Truck, Heavy, Blue Forces Motorbike, Militia
Truck, Heavy, Civilian Armour, Light, Blue Forces 4WD, Civilian Car, Civilian
Truck, Heavy, Blue Forces Armour, Light, Red Forces 4WD, Blue Forces Car, Blue Forces
Truck, Heavy, Red Forces Armour, Heavy, Blue Forces Motorbike, Civilian Car, Red Forces
4WD, Civilian IFV, Blue Forces Car, Civilian Car, Militia
4WD, Blue Forces Car, Blue Forces
4WD, Red Forces Armour, Light, Blue Forces
4WD, Militia Armour, Heavy, Blue Forces
Motorbike, Civilian IFV, Blue Forces
Motorbike, Militia
Car, Civilian
Car, Blue Forces
Car, Red Forces
Car, Militia
Red Forces Militia Red Forces Armed Red Forces Unarmed
Truck, Light, Red Forces 4WD, Militia 4WD, Red Forces Truck, Light, Red Forces
Truck, Medium, Red Forces Motorbike, Militia 4WD, Red Forces Truck, Medium, Red Forces
Truck, Heavy, Red Forces Car, Militia Armour, Light, Red Forces Car, Red Forces
4WD, Red Forces
Car, Red Forces
Armour, Light, Red Forces
Blue Armed Blue Unarmed Blue Armour Civilian
Truck, Heavy, Blue Forces Truck, Light, Blue Forces Armour, Light, Blue Forces Truck, Light, Civilian
4WD, Blue Forces Truck, Medium, Blue Force Armour, Heavy, Blue Forces Truck, Medium, Civilian
Armour, Light, Blue Forces Car, Blue Forces IFV, Blue Forces Truck, Heavy, Civilian
Armour, Heavy, Blue Forces 4WD, Civilian
IFV, Blue Forces Motorbike, Civilian
Car, Civilian
Unfriendly Unfriendly Armed Friendly Unarmed
Truck, Light, Red Forces Truck, Heavy, Red Forces Truck, Light, Civilian
Truck, Medium, Red Forces 4WD, Red Forces Truck, Light, Blue Forces
Truck, Heavy, Red Forces 4WD, Militia Truck, Medium, Civilian
4WD, Red Forces Motorbike, Militia Truck, Medium, Blue Forces
4WD, Militia Car, Militia Truck, Heavy, Civilian
Motorbike, Militia Armour, Light, Red Forces 4WD, Civilian
Car, Red Forces Motorbike, Civilian
Car, Militia Car, Civilian
Armour, Light, Red Forces Car, Blue Forces
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Truck Blue Forces Armoured
Truck, Light, Civilian Truck, Heavy, Blue Forces Armour, Light, Blue Forces
Truck, Light, Blue Forces 4WD, Blue Forces Armour, Light, Red Forces
Truck, Light, Red Forces Armour, Light, Blue Forces Armour, Heavy, Blue Forces
Truck, Medium, Civilian Armour, Heavy, Blue Forces IFV, Blue Forces
Truck, Medium, Blue Forces IFV, Blue Forces
Truck, Medium, Red Forces
Truck, Heavy, Civilian
Truck, Heavy, Blue Forces
Truck, Heavy, Red Forces
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C.2 UAVs
Aerosonde
Cruise Speed 21.0m/s
Max Speed 41.0m/s
Min Speed 15.0.0m/s
Max Bank
0.8rad
14o
Sensors 1 x IR or 1 x Vision
Fast Delta
Cruise Speed 30.0m/s
Max Speed 46.0m/s
Min Speed 22.0.0m/s
Max Bank
1.1rad
65o
Sensors
2 x Vision or 1 x Vision + 1 x IR
or 1 x Radar
C.3 Sensor Models
Figure C.5: Probability of detection as a function of Johnson cycles
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C.3.1 Sensor Orientations
Figure C.6: Look Forward Orientation - Enum 0
C.3 Sensor Models 153
Figure C.7: Look Down Orientation - Enum 1
Figure C.8: Look Left Orientation - Enum 2
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Figure C.9: Look Right Orientation - Enum 3
Figure C.10: Look Left and Down Orientation - Enum 4
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Figure C.11: Look Right and Down Orientation - Enum 5
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C.3.2 Simulated Infra-Red Sensor
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C.3 Sensor Models 158
C.3 Sensor Models 159
C.3 Sensor Models 160
C.3.3 Simulated Colour Vision Sensor
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C.3 Sensor Models 162
C.3 Sensor Models 163
C.3 Sensor Models 164
C.3.4 Simulated Black and White Vision Sensor
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C.3 Sensor Models 167
C.3 Sensor Models 168
C.3.5 Simulated Radar Sensor
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